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ABSTRACT 
HELLO, IS ANYBODY THERE? 
CORPORATE ACCESSIBILITY FOR MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AS A 
SIGNAL OF AGENCY PROBLEMS IN CHINA 
by 
ZHAO Xiaofeng 
Master of Philosophy 
My thesis examines whether corporate accessibility for minority shareholders, 
defined as the ease with which minority shareholders are able to contact corporate 
insiders, can be a signal of the severity of a firm’s agency problems. Using Chinese 
public listed firms as the testing group, I find that accessible firms are associated 
with less serious agency problems than is the case for non-accessible firms. 
Specifically, accessible firms tend to be associated with lower agency costs, lower 
cost of equity, higher firm valuation, and better operating performance. I also find 
that accessibility can signal agency problems in firms with different ownership and 
corporate governance structures, though the signaling effects are weaker in the firms 
where the incentives of insiders are tied less closely to stock price performance. 
Overall, my results indicate that corporate accessibility for minority shareholders is a 
value-relevant signal for investors to detect the quality of the publicly listed firms in 
China. 
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Hello, Is Anybody There? 
Corporate Accessibility for Minority Shareholders as a Signal of Agency Problems 
in China 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In economies where legal protection for minority shareholders is weak, minority 
shareholders usually have little opportunity to mitigate agency problems or to obtain 
redress from corporate insiders when the insiders expropriate resources from the firm. 
In these economies, how to identify the existence and severity of agency problems 
within corporations is an important question for minority shareholders. If the agency 
probems can be identified then minority investors can protect their interests by avoiding 
investing in firms with high agency costs (or else can “price protect” themselves). 
Identification of agency problems is also an important issue for regulators so that they 
can better utilize their supervisory resources and target high risk firms. This study 
examines whether corporate accessibility, defined as the ease with which minority 
shareholders are able to contact corporate insiders, is a value-relevant signal of the 
severity of agency problems. I test my hypotheses by using data from China’s listed 
firms. The legal protection for investors in China is weak and the publicly listed firms 
are plagued by serious agency problems (Gul et al. 2010; Jiang et al. 2010; Wei et al. 
2005). The publicly listed firms in China also have a well-balanced mixture of 
state-owned and privately listed firms who are operating under different corporate 
governance structures and institutional environments (Sun and Tong 2003). This 
provides me with a very useful venue to test the relative effectiveness of corporate 
accessibility in detecting agency problems in firms with different ownership and 
corporate governance structures.  
2 
 
Agency problems are inherently difficult to identify because of the inherent 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders (Westphal and Zajac 1994; 
Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992). Here, insiders usually adopt various strategies to hide 
their self-dealing activities from outsiders (Boubaker and Labégorre 2008; Haw et al. 
2004; Leuz et al. 2003). Such information obfuscation is easier to implement when a 
country’s laws are silent on expropriation or when the enforcement of corporate fraud 
laws is weak (Bushman et al. 2004). 
The existing literature has employed three approaches to identify and measure 
agency problems within corporations. The first approach focuses on the ownership 
structures of corporate insiders such as ownership stakes and divergence between 
control rights and cash flow rights (Bebchuk et al. 2000; Ang et al. 2000; La Porta et al. 
2000). Here, the major hypothesis is that corporate insiders are less likely to hurt the 
interests of minority shareholders if their incentives are also tied closely to stock prices. 
The second approach anchors on internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as independent directors and institutional investors (Aggarwal et al. 
2011; Harford et al. 2008). The major hypothesis underlying this approach is that the 
insiders who face stronger governance monitoring and more disciplinary constraints 
would enjoy less discretion to pursue their own private interests at the expense of the 
minority shareholders. The final approach seeks to obtain information about insiders’ 
tendencies to expropriate minority shareholders by focusing on insiders’ actual 
decisions and behaviors such as private uses of corporate resources (Yermack 2006) and 
Directors’ and Officers’ insurance (Kang and Klausner 2011). This approach builds on 
the revealed preference approach1, which suggests that insiders’ actual decisions can 
reveal important and valuable information about the hard-to-observe motivation of 
                                                
1 The revealed preference approach I adopted here is in line with the revealed preference theory 
pioneered by Paul Samuelson. In his study, Samuelson (1938) argues that consumers’ preferences can be 
revealed by their purchasing habits. 
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insiders and thus allow outsiders to infer the agency problems within corporations. 
Recent studies have demonstrated that corporate unethical behaviors are influenced 
not only by ownership and corporate governance structures, but also other hard to be 
observed factors such as insiders’ personality traits, norms, and values (Graham et al. 
2013; Rijsenbilt and Commandeur 2012; Grullon et al. 2009). Furthermore, ownership 
structure and corporate governance features can be a noisy proxy of corporate insiders’ 
tendency to engage in self-dealing activities in countries with inadequate enforcement 
capacity (Letza et al. 2004; Fan et al. 2011). Under this circumstance, the revealed 
preference approach may offer additional information about the severity of agency 
problems that cannot be captured by ownership and corporate governance variables.  
My study follows the reveal preference approach to examine whether corporate 
accessibility for minority shareholders can be used to detect the severity of agency 
problems within corporations. Due to rapid technological innovations in the past two 
decades, outside investors can contact corporate insiders more easily. Nowadays, many 
corporations have set up their own company websites. Most of these websites include 
an investor relations section that provides information to investors for contacting 
corporate insiders. Nevertheless, many publicly listed firms do not provide effective 
accessibility for outside investors, even though communication facilities such as email 
addresses and phone numbers are provided. In its 2011 annual report about the IR 
activities of the firms in the US, the National Institute of Investor Relations indicates 
that the lack of real accessibility is a problem. In this research, I directly contact the 
firms listed on China’s stock exchanges by using the contact information provided in 
the IR section on their websites. I find that only 41% of the firms are actually accessible 
to minority shareholders.  
Can accessibility contribute to the identification of agency problems? I expect 
corporate accessibility to be systematically associated with the severity of agency 
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problems due to the cost-benefit calculus of corporate insiders in exposing information 
to outside investors. First, based on the lemon problem articulated by Akerlof (1970), 
firms with less serious agency problems (hereafter good firms) would suffer an 
undervaluation and firms with more serious agency problems (hereafter bad firms) 
would suffer an overvaluation if investors cannot distinguish between the good firms 
and bad firms. Because of this, good firms have an incentive to disclose corporate 
information to outside investors in order to correct the undervaluation, while the bad 
firms would have an incentive to withhold information so as to maintain the 
overvaluation. As a result, good firms are more likely to be responsive to 
communications initiated by minority shareholders than the bad firms in order to 
provide more information to outsiders. This valuation consideration could be especially 
salient in firms with an ownership structure where insiders’ interests are tied closely to 
equity share prices as, in this case, the insiders are affected more seriously by the 
valuation of their firms.  
Second, bad firms would suffer from more serious sanctions from regulators and 
other stakeholders than good firms if their self-dealing activities are exposed. As a result, 
bad firms would have a stronger incentive than the good firms to minimize information 
disclosure in order to reduce the risk of exposing their self-dealing activities. The need 
for information obfuscation also implies that bad firms are less likely to be responsive 
to the communications initiated by minority shareholders than good firms.  
In this study, I examine whether corporate accessibility can be a useful signaling 
device for outside investors to detect the agency problems of the firms listed on the 
Chinese stock market. Specifically, I identify the existence of signaling effects by 
examining whether corporate accessibility is significantly associated with the measures 
of agency costs, cost of equity, and firm performance. Furthermore, I examine how the 
signaling effects vary with ownership and corporate governance structures.  
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China’s stock market is the largest emerging market in the world and one where the 
listed firms are plagued by serious agency problems (Jiang et al. 2010; Wei et al. 2005). 
Investors in China are faced with a particularly daunting challenge in identifying the 
existence and the extent of agency problems because of its primitive legal framework 
(Allen et al. 2005) and weak information environment (Piotroski and Wong 2011). 
Furthermore, most of the individual shareholders in China are inexperienced investors 
who are usually uneducated and have very little professional knowledge in 
understanding the complex ownership structure and financial statements of listed firms 
(see, Ng and Wu 2006). As corporate accessibility is a signal that can be employed 
easily even by inexperienced investors, it is particularly useful for individual investors 
who do not have the time and expertise to engage in detailed analysis and research.  
The measurement of corporate accessibility for minority shareholders is a major 
challenge for my study. I focus on three communication channels provided by a firm’s 
investor relations section on their company websites: namely, on-line discussion forum, 
email, and telephone communications. For the email and telephone communications, I 
directly contact the listed firms in order to obtain a valid measure of actual accessibility. 
This is particularly important because only effective accessibility reflects corporate 
insiders’ true incentives to communicate with minority shareholders.  
Based on the data obtained from 1555 firms that have been listed on China’s two 
stock exchanges during the period 2008 to 2010, I find that accessible firms are 
associated with an ownership structure that provides insiders more incentive to pursue 
profit maximization and higher market valuation. The results are consistent with the 
cost-benefit calculus I proposed for the provision of corporate accessibility. Furthermore, 
I find that accessible firms are associated with lower agency costs, lower cost of equity, 
and better corporate performance. Specifically, I find that accessible firms, on average, 
have managerial consumption slack and tunneling of corporate funds that are 
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significantly lower than those for non-accessible firms by around 6.9% and 14.1%, 
respectively. In addition, accessible firms also tend to enjoy a reduction in cost of equity 
by 6.8%, and an improvement in firm valuation and profit margin by 6.1%, and 11.7%, 
respectively.  
Further analysis shows that corporate accessibility can have signaling effects in 
firms regardless of their ownership structure and corporate governance characteristics. 
Specifically, accessibility can detect agency costs in the state as well as privately owned 
firms, in firms characterized by high as well as low divergence between control rights 
and cash flow rights, in firms with high as well as low institutional ownership, and in 
firms with a large as well as a small proportion of independent directors. The signaling 
effects become stronger in firms with strong monitoring mechanisms but weaker in 
firms where the incentives of insiders are tied less closely to stock price performance. 
Overall, my results indicate that corporate accessibility for minority shareholders is a 
value-relevant signal of the severity of agency problems and could be helpful for 
investors in identifying the quality of listed firms in China. 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
research background and develops my research hypotheses. The research designs are 
introduced in Section 3 and the empirical results are presented in Section 4. Conclusions 
are given in the final section of the thesis. 
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2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1. Institutional Background of the Chinese Market 
The Chinese economy has witnessed tremendous growth in the past decades. By 
the end of 2010, China’s GDP has reached 5.9 trillion US$, the second largest economy 
in the world. It is expected to overtake the United States and become the largest 
economy by year 2020. Meanwhile, the Chinese stock market has also seen rapid 
growth and development. By the last trading day in 2010, the total market capitalization 
has reached 4.76 trillion US$2 (world’s second largest by the total capitalization) with 
2063 companies (2041 A shares and 108 B shares) listed on Chinese two stock 
exchanges—Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZE).  
However, the Chinese stock market remains relatively underdeveloped by 
international standards. Chinese listed firms are plagued by serious agency problems 
and are often accused of corporate misconducts, such as financial misrepresentation 
(Firth et al. 2011; Chen and Yuan 2004), corporate fraud (Chen et al. 2006), excessive 
related party transactions (Jian and Wong 2006), and controlling shareholder tunneling 
(Jiang et al. 2010). These corporate misconducts have seriously hurt the interests of 
minority shareholders. The existence of the agency problems is mainly due to Chinese 
rudimentary legal system, the concentrated ownership structures, weak corporate 
governance structures, and minority shareholders’ lack of experiences and knowledge in 
investments.  
There are several factors that have led to serious agency problems in China. Firstly, 
China has an underdeveloped legal system with weak enforcement and a capricious 
judiciary. This has aided the existence of serious agency problems in firms because it is 
                                                
2 The other three countries in top four by capitalization at the end of 2010 are: US (17.13 trillion $), 
Japan (4.10 trillion $), UK (3.11 trillion $). The data is provided by Wind Information. 
8 
 
difficult for outside shareholders to attain legal redress when they have been harmed by 
the actions of management or the controlling shareholders. China has a unique legal 
tradition that the courts are not independent of the state administrative system and the 
law is an instrument used by the ruling elite to serve administrative interests (Chen 2003; 
Jones 2003). Hutchens (2003) shows that the budgets and the appointment of judges in 
local courts are controlled by the local governments. Furthermore, the Communist Party 
political-legal committees are superimposed on the legal system and oversee the local 
courts (Chen 2003). Because of this, courts are in effect administrative instruments that 
the governments use to retain power over the listed firms, most of which are carve-out 
from large SOE groups which are often owned by local governments. Typically, the 
courts in hearing the disputes between listed enterprises and small investors will be 
more inclined to favor the interests of enterprises rather than those of small investors 
(Allen et al. 2005). As a consequence, the legal protection for minority shareholders is 
weak and they have limited opportunity to obtain redress form corporate insiders 
through the legal system.  
Secondly, Chinese listed firms have a concentrated ownership structure that is 
often dominated by a large shareholder (typically the state owner). This ownership 
structure intensifies the conflicts of interests between corporate insiders and minority 
shareholders. There are two basic reasons for this: First, most listed firms are spin-offs 
from existing SOEs. The process creates inherent business and personnel connections 
between the listed firms and the unlisted parent firms. Insiders might use the listed firm 
as a vehicle to raise funds from outsider investors and tunnel those resources to their 
parent companies. For example, the listed firms tunnel funds back to support a parent 
firm’s unprofitable business units (Aharony et al. 2005), or to enhance a controlling 
shareholder’s wealth via a parent firm that is 100% owned by the controlling 
shareholder. Second, tradable shares held by individual and institutional investors are 
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separated from the non-tradable shares held by state government state agencies and 
legal entities. This also aggravates the conflicts of interests. Because the interests of 
non-tradable shareholders are not directly affected by the movement of the stock market, 
non-tradable controlling shareholders are less likely to focus on the shareholder value as 
reflected by stock price performance. Instead, they are likely to make decisions that 
benefit themselves but hurt the interests of the minority shareholders. 
Thirdly, many governance control mechanisms exist in principal but appear less 
effective in practice. China has adopted a modern enterprise system and corporate 
governance structure similar to those seen in western countries. For example, the 
structures and responsibilities of the boards of directors are designed to follow the 
governance guidelines and practices adopted by the firms in mature markets. Chinese 
firms also have a supervisory board, the major duties of which are to review the 
financial statements and oversee the boards of directors. However, the appointment 
criteria of top executives and directors in Chinese listed firms are different from those in 
the mature markets such as the U.S. In China, senior managers and directors are often 
appointed by the state or local governments, and the Communist Party also has 
substantial influence on the appointments (Chen et al. 2006). Because of this, top 
executives will be primarily responsible to the controlling shareholders (the state 
owners) instead of the general public shareholders. 
Fourthly, minority shareholders generally lack investment experience and have a 
limited wherewithal to obtain information about the operations of listed firms. Unlike 
the stock markets in developed countries, where institutional investors play a significant 
role, stock market trading in China is dominated by individual investors. Li and Wang 
(2008) show that individual investors dominate Chinese stock market in terms of both 
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number of investment accounts and trading volumes3. However, most of the individual 
shareholders in China are inexperienced investors who have very little professional 
knowledge4 (Ng and Wu 2006). They lack both the time and skills to thoroughly search 
for and then analyze information from firms’ financial reports and other announcements, 
and thus suffer an information disadvantage. In addition, the shareholdings of the 
typical minority shareholder are generally too small to have an effective influence on 
corporate decisions. As a result, they do not have sufficient capacity to protect their 
interests. Thus, they suffer seriously from agency problems. 
To some extent the Chinese government has recognized the problems outlined 
above and have introduced significant changes and reforms to the legal framework, 
regulations, and corporate governance. China’s Company Law and Securities Law were 
amended in 2005 with the objective of increasing shareholder protection. For example, 
it is now possible to take legal actions against listed firms and corporate insiders. As a 
result, we see an increasing number of lawsuits being filed against listed firms 
nationwide (Chen 2003). Zou et al. (2008) confirms the increasing level of litigation 
risk faced by firms in China by evidencing that firms exposed to higher litigation risk 
are more likely to take out directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. Therefore, 
litigation risk has become a concern for corporate insiders in China.     
Furthermore, China has been making efforts to strengthen the corproate 
governance system by introducing a series of reforms. One key reform is the 
introduction of the independent director system formalized by the CSRC in 2001, which 
requires all companies listed on China’s two stock exchanges have to appoint at least 
two independent directors on their board of directors and ensure that their board 
                                                
3 By the end of 2007, the market share of individual investors is 72% in terms of account numbers and 
51.3% in terms of funds invested (China Securities and Futures Statistical Yearbook, 2007). 
4 Based on a survey on individual investors conducted by Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2010, most 
investors think there are too many terminologies in listed firms’ annual/interim reports and the readability 
is weak. In addition, they think the reliability and relevancy of the contents are not high. 
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comprises at least one-third independent directors. The regulations specified that the 
“independent director shall express an independent opinion on the major events that 
occurred in the listed company”, including “events that the independent director 
considers detrimental to the interests of the minority shareholders” (CSRC 2001, 2002). 
As a result, independent directors are assigned with the responsibility of protecting 
minority shareholders from abuses by corporate insiders.   
In the year 2000, the Chinese government made a strategic decision to develop the 
mutual fund industry in the domestic market (CSRC 2000). In addition, foreign 
institutional investors have also been allowed to invest in Chinese listed firms through 
the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor Scheme (QFIIs) since 2002. As institutional 
investors tend to have greater incentives as well as the capacity to monitor corporate 
insiders (Aggarwal et al. 2011), the emergence of institutional investors in China is 
expected to improve the corporate governance of Chinese listed firms. 
In addition to the introduction of independent directors and institutional investors, 
investor relations management has attracted more attention from the regulators in China. 
In December 2004, CSRC issued a regulation5 urging the listed companies to abstain 
from abusing their control over the firm and to effectively protect the rights and 
interests of minority shareholders. In particular, the regulation also requires listed 
companies to offer various forms of communication channels, such as telephone, and 
investor relations services and that they be disclosed in companies’ websites in order to 
allow minority shareholders to communicate with the firms.  
Despite the changes and reforms in legal system, regulations, and corporate 
governance, the institutional environment in China is still poor by international 
standards (Piotroski and Wong 2011). Piotroski and Wong (2011) show that the 
                                                
5 “The Provisions on Strengthening the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the General Public 
Shareholders” (No. 118 [2004] of CSRC). 
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institutional environment for China’s listed firms is strong on the basis of regulations 
and standards alone but weak on the basis of practices. As a result, many of the changes 
in corporate governance amount to “window dressing” that do not produce much 
meaningful change in the governance practices. As a consequence, Chinese listed firms 
are still seriously plagued by agency problems. 
 
2.2. Related Literatures 
My research is related to two lines of studies. The most relevant one is the 
literature on agency problems. The other one is the literature on corporate 
communications. As I have discussed in the introduction, existing studies on agency 
problems seek to measure or detect agency problems by three approaches: ownership 
structure, corporate governance, and revealed preference. Existing studies related to 
these three approaches are briefly discussed below. 
Ownership structure has been shown to be closely related with agency problems 
(La Porta et al. 2000; La Porta et al. 1999). Specifically, firms are less likely to be 
associated with serous agency problems if the firms’ ownership structure closely aligns 
the insiders’ incentives with those of outside investors. In China, the most salient 
ownership characteristic is the stakes of the state and local government. Many existing 
studies have evidenced that state ownership is associated with severe agency problems 
and thus poor firm performance (Gul et al. 2010; Sun and Tong 2003; Wei et al. 2005). 
The rise of agency problems due to the existence of state ownership is often attributed 
to the argument that state owners usually pursue the political and social goals of the 
government and these diverge from the minority shareholders’ goal of profit 
maximization, and that non-state firms (private and foreign firms), on the other hand, 
are more likely to focus on maximizing a firm’s profit. Although agency problems are 
prevalent in SOEs due to the lack of incentive structure of state-owners, they are not 
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unique to SOEs but are also present in private firms (see, Morck and Yeung 2003). This 
raises the question of whether there is a signal that can detect agency problems in firms 
with different ownership.  
In addition, the agency problems in China’s listed firms are severe due to the 
ownership structure characterized by a high divergence between control rights and 
cash-flow rights (Wei et al. 2005). Namely, the owners with block-holdings often have 
significant control rights that are in excess of cash-flow rights. This creates substantial 
incentives for insiders to engage in “tunneling” and other moral hazard activities 
because these insiders have a greater capability to divert firm resource for private 
benefits while they do not need to bear the financial consequences corresponding to 
those activities (Lin et al. 2011a; López de Silanes et al. 2000). Prior studies on the 
Chinese market suggest that firms with large control-ownership wedge are more likely 
to be involved in intra-group capital flows (e.g. inter-corporate loans) that corporate 
insiders use to transfer firm resources for their private interests (see, Jiang et al. 2010). 
However, the intra-group capital flows in firms with a large control-ownership wedge 
can also be motivated by capital allocation efficiency (Fan et al. 2011). In addition, Fan 
et al. (2012) further show that the creation of a pyramidal ownership structure is also 
motivated by the need to shield from government interventions – an important source of 
agency costs in China. The mixed motives associated with pyramidal ownership have 
introduced noise to the detection of agency problems.   
Corporate governance mechanisms have been suggested as ways to inhibit the 
agency problems as they could exert monitoring and disciplinary pressures on corporate 
insiders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Typical instances of such mechanisms are 
independent directors and institutional investors. Some early studies in China suggest 
that independent directors can improve firm performance and firm value (Bai et al. 
2005), and ownership by mutual funds has a positive impact on firm performance (Yuan 
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et al. 2008). These findings are consistent with the regulatory efforts in China to 
promote independent directors and institutional ownership as governance control 
mechanisms. However, more recent studies show that these governance mechanisms do 
not work as effectively as expected. For example, a recent study by Lin et al. (2012b) 
shows that independent directors are hesitant to oppose the insiders and are reluctant to 
provide dissenting opinions, and their “voice” is constrained by cultural, social and 
political factors. Studies also show that most Chinese financial institutions are passive 
and short-term investors, and play no role in firm performance (e.g.Yuan et al. 2009; 
Tenev et al. 2002). The findings of ineffective governance mechanisms are likely due to 
the weak legal framework and poor institutional environment in China. 
In addition to the ownership and corporate governance structures, recent studies 
show that individual heterogeneity (e.g. psychological traits and attitudes) matters in 
corporate finance and governance (Graham et al. 2013; Rijsenbilt and Commandeur 
2012; Grullon et al. 2009). The study by Graham et al. (2013) show that CEOs’ 
underlying attitudes have significant impacts on corporate capital structure and 
acquisition decisions. Specifically, they find that risk-tolerant CEOs are more likely to 
engage in mergers and acquisitions, and that optimistic CEOs are more likely to use 
short-term debts. Grullon et al. (2009) show that cultural factors have an impact on the 
likelidood of unethical corporate behavior by evidencing that the likelihood of 
undesirable corporate behavior (class action lawsuits, option backdating, excessive 
executive compensation, and earnings management) desreases with higher levels of 
religiosity.  
The mixed findings on the ownership and governance structures in detecting the 
agency problems and the presence of hard to detect individual heterogeneity in 
determining the agency problems motivate me to use a revealed preference approach to 
identify the agency problems within corporations. This approach seeks to obtain 
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information about insiders’ tendencies to expropriate minority shareholders by focusing 
on insiders’ actual decision and behaviors.  
Several studies use the revealed preference approach to investigate insiders’ 
tendencies to engage in self-dealing activities by focusing on insiders’ behaviors. One 
such study is Yermack (2006) that focuses on the private uses of corporate resources. 
He shows that firms experience severe market shortfalls when CEOs are permitted the 
use of corporate aircraft, which cannot be explained simply by the costs of resources 
consumed. The consumption of a corporate jet resource can be a signal of waste, poor 
corporate governance, and other unethical managerial behaviors. The disclosure of this 
perk consumption thus reveals important information about a firm’s quality and can 
trigger investors’ market reaction. Some other related studies are the research on 
directors’ & officers’ insurance (Kang and Klausner 2011; Lin et al. 2012a; Lin et al. 
2011b). D&O insurance insulates directors and officers from the threat of litigation and 
personal financial liability resulting from their decisions on behalf of the corporation. 
Corporate insiders who have the intention to engage in self-dealing and other moral 
hazard activities could be more likely to purchase the D&O insurance. Therefore, D&O 
insurance required by insiders could be a good reflection of the hard to observe agency 
problems. For example, Kang and Klausner (2011) find that D&O premiums are 
negatively related with measures of corporate governance, which suggests that the D&O 
premiums are a reflection of the quality of corporate governance and can be used as a 
signaling device to measure the quality of a firm’s governance. My study contributes to 
the literature by focusing on corporate accessibility as a new detection device and 
examines its signaling effectiveness in an emerging market rather than in a mature 
market.  
In addition to the literature on agency problems, my study is also related to the 
studies on communications between corporate insiders and outsiders. Most existing 
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studies on the communications between corporate insiders and outsiders focus on 
communications initiated by corporate insiders, such as corporate presentations (Francis 
et al. 1997), conference calls (Bowen et al. 2002), and private meetings with analysts 
and investors (Bowen et al. 2002; Green et al. 2012), and examine their impact on the 
corporate information environment. However, the findings are mixed. Some studies 
show that communications with outsides can improve a firm’s information environment 
(Agarwal et al. 2008; Bushee and Miller 2012; Chang et al. 2008; Kirk 2008; Bowen et 
al. 2002; Green et al. 2012). Some studies, on the other hand, show that 
communications actually have no impact on corporate information environment 
(Farraghe et al. 1994; Francis et al. 1997; Gillies and Dennis 1973; Peasnell et al. 2011). 
Unlike these existing studies, my study focuses on communications initiated by 
outsiders, which have not been examined in other studies. Instead of focusing on the 
effects of communications on corporate transparency, I examine whether corporate 
accessibility might provide us with a plausible device to identify the severity of the 
agency problems and the quality of corporate governance in listed companies. 
My research method and approach is similar to a recent study conducted by Chong 
et al. (2012). This study examines the government efficiency across countries by 
mailing letters to non-existent business addresses and measuring whether they come 
back to a return address. This study finds that the number of days before the mails are 
returned could be explained by a set of variables that measure the government efficiency, 
and suggests that a simple and universal post office service could be used as signal for 
detecting the quality of government. In my study, I contact the Chinese listed firms and 
use their responsiveness to detect the quality of the firms.  
 
2.3. Hypotheses Development 
Given the existence of severe agency problems and the poor institutional 
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arrangements in China, minority shareholders have little opportunity to mitigate the 
expropriation problems. In light of this, it is important that outsiders can identify firms 
with severe agency problems so as to better manage their portfolios and protect their 
interests. The accessibility of corporate insiders to the communications initiated by 
outside minority shareholders may shed some light on this issue as the severity of 
agency problems can be systematically associated with insiders’ responsiveness to the 
communications initiated by minority shareholders. There are two basic reasons for this, 
which I discuss below: 
Firstly, the offering of accessibility for outsider investors reflects corporate insiders’ 
incentives to reduce the information gap between themselves and outsiders. Good firms 
will benefit more from reducing the gap. If investors cannot distinguish between good 
firms and bad firms, good firms (bad firms) would experience an undervaluation 
(overvaluation) (Akerlof 1970). Thus, good firms are more likely to be responsive to 
communications initiated by shareholders in order to correct the undervaluation. Such 
incentive is stronger for firms where the incentives of insiders are tied closely to stock 
price performance (Morck et al. 1988). In contrast, bad firms tend to avoid 
communications and withhold information so as to maintain the overvaluation (Nagar et 
al. 2003).  
Secondly, the presence of information asymmetry is a pre-condition for the 
emergence of agency problems (Jensen and Meckling 1976). To the extent that 
communications with outside shareholders will increase the amount of information 
disclosed to outsiders, accessible firms face a greater risk of exposing expropriation 
activities to outsiders than non-accessible firms. As argued by Bushee and Noe (2000), 
corporate disclosure is a low-cost mechanism for monitoring agency problems. As the 
risk of exposure is higher and the resulting punishments are heavier for the insiders who 
have engaged in value-destroying expropriation activities, they will have a lower 
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incentive to provide accessibility to outside investors. Consistent with this prediction, 
existing studies have found that firms plagued by more serious agency problems tend to 
disclose less firm-specific information to outsiders (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003; Ho and 
Wong, 2001). 
Therefore, I expect that good firms are more likely to be responsive to the 
communications initiated by minority shareholders than bad firms. Namely, corporate 
accessibility would be negatively associated with the severity of agency problems and 
thus agency costs. Accordingly, I make my first hypothesis as follows: 
H1a: Accessible firms are associated with lower agency costs than 
non-accessible firms. 
 
Lin et al. (2011a) show that “tunneling” activities that firms engage in will increase 
the probability of costly lower-tail outcomes and result in higher uncertainty about 
firm’s future prospects, consequently resulting in higher external financing costs. To the 
extent that corporate accessibility is associated with the severity of agency problems 
among the Chinese listed firms, I expect to observe a negative relation between 
corporate accessibility and the cost of equity. Accordingly, I hypothesize: 
H1b: Accessible firms are associated with a lower cost of equity than 
non-accessible firms. 
 
Furthermore, the existence of agency problems will detract from a firm’s 
profitability and eventually reduce firm value (Jensen 1986; Brown and Caylor 2009; 
Core et al. 1999). I therefore also expect to see a positive relation between corporate 
accessibility and firm performance. Accordingly, I hypothesize: 
H1c: Accessible firms are associated with higher firm value and better operating 
performance than non-accessible firms. 
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I define the significant associations as stated in Hypotheses 1a-1c as the signaling 
effects of corporate accessibility. I expect that the signaling effects may vary with a 
firm’s ownership and corporate governance structures. Specically, the signaling effects 
will be less (more) salient if good firms are less (more) willing to incure the costs of 
communications and choose to be non-accessible (accessible). Among good firms, the 
insiders whose interests are not tied closely to stock price performance will have a 
lower level of incentive to offer accessibility to outside investors than are the 
corresponding insiders whose incentives are tied more closely to stock price. This arises 
as the former type of insiders enjoys fewer benefits resulting from the valuation 
improvement. Due to the lower incentive of the good firms (whose managers’ incentives 
are not tied to stock prices) to separate themselves from the bad firms, I expect that 
corporate accessibility will be a weaker signal of agency problems for this type of 
insiders. I develop two hypotheses to examine this issue.  
First, I focus on the ownership structures of controlling shareholders and test 
whether the signaling effects are weaker in firms where the controlling shareholders 
tend to have a lower incentive to maximize shareholder value. Given the disincentive of 
value maximization in the ownership structures where state is the ultimate owner (see, 
Wei et al. 2005) and control rights are substantially in excess of cash-flow rights (see, 
La Porta et al. 2000), I expect that the signaling effects would be weaker in state owned 
firms and in firms with a higher divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights 
than that in privately owned firms and in firms with a low divergence. My hypothesis is 
as follows: 
H2a: The signaling effects would be weaker in state owned firms and in firms 
with higher divergence between control rights and cash-low rights than in privately 
owned firms and in firms with a lower divergence between control rights and 
cash-low rights. 
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Second, I focus on internal and external governance structures and examine 
whether the signaling effects are stronger in firms with superior governance structures. 
Good firms who face higher disciplinary pressures would have a greater incentive to 
maximize shareholder value and thus are more likely to provide accessibility than the 
corresponding good firms who face lower disciplinary pressures. Given the monitoring 
and disciplinary pressures exerted by institutional ownership (Yuan et al. 2009) and 
independent directors (Bai et al. 2005), I expect that the signaling effects would be 
stronger in firms with higher institutional ownership and greater proportion of 
independent directors than in firms with lower institutional ownership and smaller 
proportion of independent directors. Accordingly, I make the following hypothesis: 
H2b: The signaling effects would be stronger in firms with higher institutional 
ownership and in firms with greater proportion of independent directors than in firms 
with lower institutional ownership and smaller proportion of independent directors. 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1. Data Collection and Measures of Corporate Accessibility 
I followed a detailed procedure to collect data on the corporate accessibility of 
China’s listed firms. The details of the data collection procedures are provided in the 
Appendix. I briefly discuss my key procedures here.  
First, I obtain the website addresses of all the firms listed on China’s two stock 
exchanges from the China Securities Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR), and 
then check whether there is an investor relations section (IR section or IR subpage) 
identified on the main page. If yes, I then proceed to that section and examine whether 
the following disclosures are made: 1) whether there was an on-line discussion forum 
with records of communications between investors and the firm. If yes, then 
FORUM_ACS is set equal to 1 (accessible), and 0 (non-accessible) otherwise. 2) 
whether the IR section offers an email contact. If yes, I then contact the listed firm to 
confirm its accessibility. I directly send an email to the firm asking a general 
question—the major locations where the firms have their business operations. If the 
firm actually replied to me, then EMAIL_ACS is set to 1 (accessible), and 0 
(non-accessible) otherwise. 3) whether the IR section offered telephone contact 
information. To confirm a firm’s accessibility by phone, I directly made a call to a firm 
by enquiring whether shareholders can pay a visit to the firm. If I get to talk with the 
company on this issue, I set CALL_ACS to 1 (accessible), and 0 otherwise 
(non-accessible). In addition, I create another dummy variable IR_ACS. It is set to 1 if at 
least one of the above three communication channels is accessible, and 0 if none of 
them is accessible6. This data-collection process took me 3 months from July to 
                                                
6 The four accessibility measures (IR_ACS, CALL_ACS, EMAIL_ACS, and FORUM_ACS) take the value 
of 0 (non-accessible) if there is not an IR section on the firm’s website.  
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September in 20107, covering all firms listed on two Chinese stock exchanges at the end 
of 2009.  
 
3.2.  Empirical Models and Methodology 
3.2.1 Self-selection Problems and The Determinants of Accessibility 
The sample selection problem is the a major concern in my study as my data 
collection involves a progress step by step survey where nonrandom sampling in any 
step might introducue a selection bais in the estimation8. If this is the case, the 
responsiveness of firms with an IR section might not be a reliable estimate of what 
firms without an IR section would have done. Basically, there may be two sources of 
selection problem. First, I contact firms using the contact information collected from the 
IR section on their website. There may be unobservable factors that that make some 
firms more likely to set the IR section. For example, companies with good past 
performance are more likely to have a well-established IR communication partform. 
Second, if there are any unovervable factors affect firms’ responsiveness, or the first 
source of slection problem exists, then the estimates of the signaling effects of corporate 
accessibility will be inconsistent. 
I follow Campa and Kedia (2002) and Hoechle et al. (2012) and use a two-step 
Heckman (1979) framework to deal with the existence of the two sources of 
self-selection. This framework involves the estimations of two decisions. The first 
decision is the decision to set up an IR section on a firm’s website and the second 
decision is the decision to be accessible or not accessible to outside shareholders. 
 Specifically, I first estimate a probit model for the IR section decision (equation 
1), and obtain the inverse Mill’s ratio to capture the unobservable characteristics of the 
                                                
7 During this period, I was employed as a research assistant before enrolling in the MPhil program in the 
Finance & Insurance Department at Lingnan University. 
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firms that have an IR section on their websites. I use this inverse Mills ratio as an 
explanatory variable when I estimate a probit model for the accessibility decision 
(equation 2). I obtain another inverse Mill’s ratio from the accessibility decision model 
and then use it as an explanatory variable when I estimate the association between 
corporate accessibility and agency costs (cost of equity and firm performance). The 
models are: 
 
ܹܫܴ௜,௧ = ߙ଴ +		ߙଵܵܶܣܶܧ௜.௧ +	ߙଶܥ ௜ܱ 	+ 		ߙଷܫ ௜ܱ,௧ +		ߙସܫܰܦ ௜ܲ,௧ +	ߙହܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ 	+ ߙ଺ܮܧ ௜ܸ,௧
+					 	ߙ଻ܸܱܮ௜,௧ +	ߙ଼ܫܮܮܫܳ௜,௧ + ߙଽܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߙଵ଴ܦ2004௜,௧ +ߙଵଵܱܥܮ௜,௧
+						෍ܫܰܦ௜,௧ +	෍ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ 																																																																							(1) 
 
ܣܥ ௜ܵ,௧ = ߚ଴ +		ߚଵܵܶܣܶܧ௜,௧ +	ߚଶܥ ௜ܱ,௧ 	+		ߚଷܫ ௜ܱ,௧ +	 	ߚସܫܰܦ ௜ܲ,௧ +	ߚହܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ 	+ ߚ଺ܮܧ ௜ܸ,௧
+	ߚ଻ܸܱܮ௜,௧ +	ߚ଼ܫܮܮܫܳ௜,௧ + ߚଽܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚଵ଴ܦ2004௜,௧ + ߚଵଵܱܥܮ௜,௧
+	ߚଵଶܮܾܽ݉݀ܽ௜,௧ +෍ܫܰܦ௜,௧ +	෍ܻ݁ܽݎ୲ 																																														(2) 
 
Where, i and j indexes observations of firms and years, respectively. The 
dependent variable in IR decision model is WIR, which is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 if a firm has an IR section on its website and 0 otherwise. The dependent 
variable in the accessibility decision model is ACS, which is one of the four corporate 
accessibility measures, namely, IR_ACS, CALL_ACS, EMAIL_ACS, and FORUM_ACS. 
As I have discussed previously, firms are more likely to provide accessibility to 
outsiders when there is an ownership structure where the benefits of insiders are tied 
closely to the movement of share prices, and when strong internal and external 
governance mechanisms are implemented. Therefore, I control for a set of variables that 
capture a firm’s ownership and governance structures. The first variable is STATE, a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder is a 
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state entity and 0 otherwise. The second variable is CO. It is a ratio of the ultimate 
controlling shareholders’ control rights over the cash-flow ownership rights. The third 
variable is IO. It is the percentage shares owned by institutional investors. Lastly, I 
control for the independence of directors measured by the number of independent 
directors over the total directors on the board (INDP).  
In addition, I control for firm’s profitability (ROA) because more profitable firms 
may select to set up the IR and provide accessibility. I will further address this 
endogeneity issue using a formal two-stage IV method in the robustness check (the 
details and results can be seen in section 4.5.1). Finally, I control for a set of firm 
characteristics and risk factors that might have impacts on the decision to set up an IR 
and the determinant of corporate accessibility, including firm size (SIZE), financial 
leverage (LEV), standard deviation of the EPS in the past five year (VOL), stock trading 
illiquidity (ILLIQ), and industry (∑ IND୧	) and time year (∑Year୧) fixed effects. ILLIQ 
is defined as the annual average ratio of the daily absolute returns to the trading volume 
(in 100 million RMB) on that day (see, Amihud 2002). 
In my Heckman approach, I use two variables as instruments when I estimate the 
accessibility decision. The first one is the length of optical cable lines in the province 
where a firm is located (OCL). It is very likely a good instrument for my accessibility 
variable because most communications between firms and outside investors in China 
are carried out via telecommunication means. Optical cable lines are the medium for 
connecting remote communication terminals (including computers and phones). I 
expect that the firms in a region with better development of the telecommunication 
technology will have a greater inclination to provide accessibility to outside investors 
via computers and phones. Thus, I expect the length of optical cable lines in each 
province should be correlated with our accessibility measures.  
The second instrument is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm was 
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listed after the year 2004, and 0 otherwise (D2004). The CSRC issued “The Provisions 
on Strengthening the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the General Public 
Shareholders” (No. 118 [2004] of CSRC) in 2004, which required listed firms in China 
to offer communication channels to minority shareholders. The complicance with this 
regulation will be an important consideration when a firm seeks approval from the 
CSRC to go public. I believe that firms listed after year 2004 are more likely to have an 
IR section and offer accessibility to minority shareholders. As a result, a dummy 
variable indicating whether a firm is listed after the year 2004 or not could serve as an 
instrumental variable for the corporate accessibility. 
 
3.2.2 Empirical Models in Testing Hypothesis 1 
H1a and H1b state that there is a negative association between corporate 
accessibility and agency costs, and between corporate accessibility and capital costs. 
H1c on the other hand, predicts that there is a positive association between corporate 
accessibility and firm performance. I estimate the following three equations to test these 
three hypotheses: 
 
ܣܥ௜,௧ = ߛ଴+	ߛଵܣܥ ௜ܵ,௧ +	ߛଶܵܶܣܶܧ௜,௧ +	ߛଷܥ ௜ܱ,௧ +	ߛସܫ ௜ܱ,௧ + 	ߛହܫܰܦ ௜ܲ,௧ +	ߛ଺ܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ 	+ 		ߛ଻ܮܧ ௜ܸ,௧
+	ߛ଼ܸܱܮ௜,௧ + ߛଽܫܮܮܫܳ௜,௧ + ߛଵ଴ܴܱܣ௜,௧ +	ߛଵଵܮܾܽ݉݀ܽ௜,௧ 
+෍ܫܰܦ௜,௧ +	෍ܻ݁ܽݎ୲ 																																																																					(3) 
 
ܥܱܥ௜,௧ = ߤ଴ +	ߤଵܣܥ ௜ܵ,௧ +	ߤଶܵܶܣܶܧ௜,௧ +	ߤଷܥ ௜ܱ,௧ +	ߤସܫܱ௜,௧ + 	ߤହܫܰܦ ௜ܲ,௧ +	ߤ଺ܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ 	
+ 	ߤ଻ܮܧ ௜ܸ,௧ +	ߤ଼ܸܱܮ௜,௧ + ߤଽܫܮܮܫܳ௜,௧ + ߤଵ଴ܣ݆ܴ݀݁ݐ௜,௧ +	ߤଵଵܮܾܽ݉݀ܽ௜,௧ 	 
+		෍ܫܰܦ௜,௧ +	෍ܻ݁ܽݎ୲ 																																																																				(4) 
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ܨ ௜ܲ,௧ = ߜ଴ +	ߜଵܣܥ ௜ܵ,௧ +	ߜଶܵܶܣܶܧ௜,௧ +	ߜଷܥ ௜ܱ,௧ +	ߜସܫ ௜ܱ,௧ + 	ߜହܫܰܦ ௜ܲ,௧ +	ߜ଺ܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ 	+ 	ߜ଻ܮܧ ௜ܸ,௧
+	ߜ଼ܸܱܮ௜,௧ + ߜଽܫܮܮܫܳ௜,௧ + ߜଵ଴ܣ݆ܴ݀݁ݐ௜,௧ +	ߜଵଵܮܾܽ݉݀ܽ௜,௧ 
+	෍ܫܰܦ௜ +	෍ܻ݁ܽݎ௜ 																																																																						(5) 
 
The dependent variable (AC) in equation 3 is the measure of a firm’s agency costs. 
AC is measured in two ways (ORECA and EXPR). ORECA is defined as other account 
receivables scaled by total assets. Jiang et al. (2010) show that the controlling 
shareholders of China’s listed firms have siphoned funds from the listed firm by the use 
of inter-corporate loans (typically reported as part of “other receivables”). Jiang et al. 
(2010) suggest that the tendency of the Chinese firms to use inter-corporate loans to 
tunnel funds has been mitigated since 2006 due to the government’s intensified efforts 
to control this kind of tunneling activity. However, I expect that the government efforts 
may not be able to totally eliminate this kind of tunneling activity and ORECA is still a 
good measure of the cross-sectional variation of the agency costs among the listed firms. 
To verify my conjecture, I follow Jiang et al. (2010) and repeat all their cross-sectional 
analyses. I obtain the same cross-sectional patterns (with the same significant relations) 
as those obtained by Jiang et al. (2010).     
The second measure of agency cost is the expense ratio (EXPR), defined as 
operating expense (the total expenses less cost of goods sold, interest expense, and 
managerial compensation) scaled by annual sales. Ang et al. (2000) suggest that the 
expense ratio  captures excessive expenses including perks consumption and therefore 
could also be a good proxy of agency costs. I expect this variable can capture the 
agency costs caused by the controlling shareholders as well as by the managers.  
  The dependent variable (COC) in equation 4 is a measure of firms’ cost of 
equity financing. I use the ex-ante or implied cost of equity capital (COC) which is 
calculated based on Easton (2003)’s modified PEG ratio model to measure the equity 
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costs. The model is specified below: 
ݎଶ − ݎ ൬
݀݌ݏଵ
݌଴
൰ −
݁݌ݏଶ − ݁݌ݏଵ
݌଴
= 0 
Where ݌଴ = current price per share, date t=0 
      ݀݌ݏଵ = expected dividends per share, date t=1 
      ݁݌ݏଵ =expected earnings per share, date t=1 
      ݁݌ݏଶ = expected earnings per share, date t=2 
 
The positive root of this quadratic equation (r) is the estimate of the cost of equity 
based on the modified PEG ratio where the modification is the inclusion of expected 
dividends. I follow Easton (2003) to constrain ݁݌ݏଶ ≥ ݁݌ݏଵ ≥ 0 so that the solution to 
the equation has two real roots one of which is positive. Forecast earnings per share in 
t=1 and t=2 are extracted from the CSMAR. However, as the forecast of dividends are 
not reported in the CSMAR, I use the current dividend per share (݀݌ݏ଴) as the estimate 
of the expected dividend per share (݀݌ݏଵ). 
I use two variables in equation 5 to measure firm’s corporate performance. One is 
Tobin’q (TobinQ), which measures relative firm value. It is defined as the ratio of the 
sum of market value of equity and net debt over total assets after subtracting net 
intangible assets. The other performance variable is net operating margin (NOM), which 
measures firm operating performance. It is defined as the net profit over operating 
revenue. 
I include a set of ownership and governance variables, namely STATE, CO, IO, and 
INDP, as control factors. The inclusion of these variables into the regression models 
allow me to isolate the effects of corporate accessibility from the confounding 
influences on our dependent variables that are caused by ownership and governance 
structures. In addition, I also control firm characteristics, and industry and time year 
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fixed effects. However, to avoid the pitfall of multicollinearity, I use market adjusted 
annual return (AdjRet) instead of ROA in equation 5 following Yuan et al. (2008) to 
control for firm’s performance because the correlation between ROA and NOM 
(between ROA and TobinQ) is as high as 0.61 (0.26).  
 Finally, the inverse Mill’s ratio (lamda) computed from accessibility determinant 
models is included in all the three regression models in order to mitigate the 
self-selection problems.  
 
3.2.3 Empirical Models in Testing Hypothesis 2 
 I use two basic methods to test Hypothesis 2, which examines how the signaling 
effects vary with the ownership and corporate governance structures. The first one is the 
portfolio sort technique. Specifically, I first sort my sample ascendingly based on the 
measures of ownership structures (STATE, and CO) and the governance structures (IO, 
INDP), and create two subsamples (Low: below the mean; High: above the mean) based 
on the value of STATE (CO, IO, or INDP). Then, within each of the Low and High 
subsamples, I further divide them into two subsamples (ACS: accessible; Non_ACS: 
non-accessible). Lastly, I separately conduct a T-test on the mean spread of agency costs, 
cost of equity, and firm performance between ACS and Non_ACS in both the Low and 
High samples respectively. 
I expect that the spreads of agency costs, cost of equity, firm value, and net 
operating margin between ACS and Non_ACS would be weaker in the High STATE and 
CO samples than in the Low STATE and CO samples (H2a). I also expect the spreads to 
be smaller in the Low IO and INDP than in the High IO and INDP samples (H2b). 
 The second technique is regression analysis. I create interaction terms between 
each of my governance variables (STATE, CO, IO, and INDP) and the measures of 
corporate accessibility ACS (IR_ACS, CALL_ACS, EMAIL_ACS, and FORUM_ACS). 
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The models are specified as follows: 
ܣܥ௜,௧ 		 = ߠ଴ +	ߠଵܣܥ ௜ܵ,௧ +	ߠଶܵܶܣܶܧ௜,௧ ∗ ܣܥ ௜ܵ,௧ +	ߠଷܥ ௜ܱ,௧ ∗ ܣܥ ௜ܵ,௧ +	ߠସܫܱ௜,௧ ∗ ܣܥ ௜ܵ,௧ 
																+	ߠହܫܰܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܣܥ ௜ܵ,௧ +	ߠ଺ܵܶܣܶܧ௜,௧ +	ߠ଻ܥܱ௜,௧ +	ߠ଼ܫ ௜ܱ,௧ + 	ߠଽܫܰܦ ௜ܲ,௧ 
																+	ߠଵ଴ܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ 	+ 	ߠଵଵܮܧ ௜ܸ,௧ + ߠଵଶܸܱܮ௜,௧ + ߠଵଷܫܮܮܫܳ௜,௧ + ߠଵସܴܱܣ௜,௧  
+	ߠଵହܮܾܽ݉݀ܽ௜,௧ +	෍ܫܰܦ௜,௧ +	෍ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ 																																																																						(6) 
 
ܥܱܥ௜,௧ = ߮଴ +	߮ଵܣܥ ௜ܵ,௧ +	߮ଶܵܶܣܶܧ௜,௧ ∗ ܣܥ ௜ܵ,௧ +	߮ଷܥ ௜ܱ,௧ ∗ ܣܥ ௜ܵ,௧ +	߮ସܫܱ௜,௧ ∗ ܣܥ ௜ܵ,௧  
																+	߮ହܫܰܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ 	ܣܥ ௜ܵ,௧ +	߮଺ܵܶܣܶܧ௜,௧ +	߮଻ܥ ௜ܱ,௧ +	଼߮ܫ ௜ܱ,௧ + 	߮ ଽܫܰܦ ௜ܲ,௧ 
																+	߮ଵ଴ܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ 	+	߮ଵଵܮܧ ௜ܸ,௧ + ߮ଵଶܸܱܮ௜,௧ + ߮ଵଷܫܮܮܫܳ௜,௧ +߮ଵସܣ݆ܴ݀݁ݐ௜,௧ 
+	ߠଵହܮܾܽ݉݀ܽ௜,௧ +	෍ܫܰܦ௜,௧ +	෍ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ 																																																																						(7) 
 
ܨ ௜ܲ,௧ 		= ߩ଴ +	ߩଵܣܥ ௜ܵ,௧ +	ߩଶܵܶܣܶܧ௜,௧ ∗ ܣܥܵ௜,௧ +	ߩଷܥ ௜ܱ,௧ ∗ ܣܥ ௜ܵ,௧ +	ߩସܫܱ௜,௧ ∗ ܣܥ ௜ܵ,௧  
															+	ߩହܫܰܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܣܥ ௜ܵ,௧ +	ߩ଺ܵܶܣܶܧ௜,௧ +	ߩ଻ܥ ௜ܱ,௧ +	ߩ଼ܫ ௜ܱ,௧ + 	ߩଽܫܰܦ ௜ܲ,௧ 
															+	ߩଵ଴ܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ 	+	ߩଵଵܮܧ ௜ܸ,௧ +ߩଵଶܸܱܮ௜,௧ + ߩଵଷܫܮܮܫܳ௜,௧ + ߩଵସܣ݆ܴ݀݁ݐ௜,௧ 
+	ߠଵହܮܾܽ݉݀ܽ௜,௧ +	෍ܫܰܦ௜,௧ +	෍ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ 																																																																						(8) 
 
Based on my hypothesis H2a, I predict that ߠଵ < 0, and ߠଶ > 0 and ߠଷ > 0 
(߮ଵ < 0, and ߮ଶ > 0 and ߮ଷ > 0; ߩଵ > 0, and ߩଶ < 0 and ߩଷ < 0). Thus, state 
ownership and the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights weaken the 
association between corporate accessibility and agency costs (cost of equity and firm 
performance). Similarly, from hypothesis H2b, I predict that ߠଵ < 0, and ߠସ < 0 and 
ߠହ < 0 (߱ଵ < 0, and ߱ସ < 0 and ߱ହ < 0; ߩଵ > 0, and ߩସ > 0 and ߩହ > 0). That is, 
institutional ownership and independent directors strengthen the association between 
corporate accessibility and agency costs (cost of equity and firm performance).  
To further examine whether the signaling effects prevail in firms with different 
ownership and governance structures, I conduct tests on the marginal effects of 
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corporate accessibility at two different levels of the governance variables, namely, the 
20th and 80th percentiles among STATE (CO, IO, INDP)9. Assuming that other variables 
are at their mean level ( തܺ), the marginal effects of corporate accessibility on agency 
costs AC (ܯܽݎ݈݃݅݊ܽ	(ܣܥ஺஼ௌ)), cost of equity COC (ܯܽݎ݈݃݅݊ܽ	(ܥܱܥ஺஼ௌ)), and firm 
performance FP (ܯܽݎ݈݃݅݊ܽ	(ܨ ஺ܲ஼ௌ)), with respect to the governance variable ܩ݋ݒ at 
the level of ݈ (ܩ݋ݒ@݈) is specified as follow10: 
ܯܽݎ݈݃݅݊ܽ(ܣܥ஺஼ௌ |ܩ݋ݒ@݈) = ܨ(ܣܥܵ = 1|ܩ݋ݒ@݈, തܺ) − ܨ(ܣܥܵ = 0|ܩ݋ݒ@݈, തܺ) 
ܯܽݎ݈݃݅݊ܽ(ܥܱܥ஺஼ௌ|ܩ݋ݒ@݈) = ܨ(ܣܥܵ = 1|ܩ݋ݒ@݈, തܺ) − ܨ(ܣܥܵ = 0|ܩ݋ݒ@݈, തܺ) 
ܯܽݎ݈݃݅݊ܽ(ܨ ஺ܲ஼ௌ |ܩ݋ݒ@݈) = ܨ(ܣܥܵ = 1|ܩ݋ݒ@݈, തܺ) − ܨ(ܣܥܵ = 0|ܩ݋ݒ@݈, തܺ) 
 
I expect the marginal effects are significant with expected signs at the different 
governance levels, indicating that the signaling effects of corporate accessibility 
generally exist in different ownership and governance circumstances although the 
effects may be weaker in some circumstances. In particular, I expect the marginal 
effects will be weaker when STATE and CO are at the 80% percentile than when they 
are at the 20% percentile, while the effects are stronger when IO and INDP are at the 80% 
percentile than when they are at the 20% percentile. This accords with H2a and H2b, 
respectively. 
 
3.3. Sample Description and Summary Statistics 
I obtain financial and firm characteristics data from the CSMAR. Due to the high 
costs involved in collecting data on corporate accessibility, I assume that a firm’s 
accessibility would be persistent over a reasonable period of years so as to extend my 
                                                
9 STATE takes the value of 0 when it is at or below the 20% percentile, and takes the value of 1 when it is 
at or above the 80% percentile. 
10 Let me use Gov=CO as an example. The marginal effects of corporate accessibility on agency costs 
with respect to CO at the 20th and 80th percentiles are computed by:  
ܯܽݎ݈݃݅݊ܽ(ܣܥ஺஼ௌ|ܥܱ@20%) 	= ߠଵ +	ߠଷ ∗ ܥܱ@20% + (ߠଶ ∗ ܵܶܣܶܧതതതതതതതതത +	ߠଶ ∗ ܫܱതതത + 	ߠଶ ∗ ܫܰܦതതതതതത)  
ܯܽݎ݈݃݅݊ܽ(ܣܥ஺஼ௌ|ܥܱ@80%) 	= ߠଵ +	ߠଷ ∗ ܥܱ@80% + (ߠଶ ∗ ܵܶܣܶܧതതതതതതതതത +	ߠଶ ∗ ܫܱതതത + 	ߠଶ ∗ ܫܰܦതതതതതത) 
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analysis over a 3-year period11. Thus, in the regressions, the corporate accessibility 
variables are time-invariant, while other quantitative variables vary over 2008 to 2010. 
Similar approaches in dealing with such kind of data limitation problems can be seen in 
Cull and Xu (2005), Lin et al. (2010), and Ayyagari et al. (2010). Finally, after 
excluding firms that are in the financial industry, have negative equity, have been listed 
for less than 1 year, and whose main page has been published for less than 1 year12, my 
final sample comprises 4247 firm-year observations.  
Table 1 provides definitions of the variables used in this study. Summary statistics 
for my sample are presented in Table 2. Panel A provides an overview of the corporate 
accessibility measures. I investigate 1555 firms in total and 67% of them have an IR 
section under their website main page. In firms with an IR section, about 85% (64%, 
28%) of the firms provide phone (email, forum) communication channels and about 20% 
(15%, 85%) of these channels are actually accessible. Taken together (see last column), 
about 93% of firms with an IR section provide at least one communication channel. 
Among these firms, 41% of them are accessible either by online discussion, email, or by 
phone.  
In Panel B, I present the basic statistics for the key variables used in this study on a 
pooled basis. The average of ORECA is about 2%, which is lower than the mean of 5.7% 
reported by Jiang et al. (2010). The reduction may be caused by the intensified efforts of 
the regulators in China to address this type of tunneling activity in July 2006. However, 
the magnitude of ORECA is still significant and we can also see substantial variations 
across firms. The mean of EXPR is 0.39. The average levels of this ratio in the US 
sample firms in Ang et al. (2000) are 0.47 and 0.52 at insider-managed firms and 
outsider-managed firms, respectively. The mean cost of equity (COC) is 5.91 percent. 
                                                
11 To verify this assumption, I collected data by re-visiting the companies’ website in August 2011, and 
found that changes were rare. Over 95% firms had no change in its investor relation contact information.  
12 Newly launched websites generally need a period for testing, during which the information provided 
may be incorrect and thus create bias in the initiation of accessibility. 
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This is slightly higher than that of around 4% that is estimated in Firth et al. (2011) 
based on the O’Hanlon and Steele model. The mean of CO is 1.36. It shows that 
controlling shareholder’s voting rights is on average greater than his cash flow rights. 
The percentage of state-owned firms (0.54) is lower than the mean of 0.67 as reported 
by Gul et al. (2010). This is consistent with the fact that more and more Chinese firms 
are being privatized and that the ownership of government has declined over time. In 
Panel C, I present the statistics of agency cost, cost of equity, and performance variables 
by year. The variations on these variables over the period are consistent with the 
movement of the macro-economy. 
Table 3 presents the matrix of Pearson pairwise correlations among the major 
variables. The four accessibility measures are highly correlated with each other. They 
are negatively correlated with the agency costs and cost of equity, and positively 
correlated with firm value and operating performance. These results are consistent with 
my first hypothesis that accessible firms who are responsive to the communications 
initiated by minority shareholders are associated with lower agency costs, higher firm 
value, superior operating performance, and lower cost of equity than the non-accessible 
firms. In addition, corporate accessibility is negatively correlated with the state 
ownership and the ratio of voting rights over cash-flow ownership rights, and positively 
correlated with the ownership by institutional investors. These results are consistent 
with my conjecture that a structure that provides insiders an incentive to pursue stock 
price appreciation is positively associated with the provision of corporate accessibility.  
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
4.1. Univariate Tests 
To provide a preliminary analysis on the determinants of corporate accessibility, 
and the association between corporate accessibility and agency costs (cost of equity and 
firm performance), I first divide my sample into two groups: accessible firm group 
(ACS) and non-accessible firm group (Non_ACS). I then conduct a T-test on the mean 
differences of key experimental variables as well as other firm characteristics between 
the two types of firm groups. The results are presented in Table 4. The results show that, 
compared with the non-accessible firms, the accessible firms on average are more likely 
to be non-state owned (STATE), have lower divergence between the voting rights and 
the cash-flow rights (CO), and have higher institutional ownership (IO). Accessible 
firms also have more independent directors on the board although the difference is not 
significant.  
Accessible firms tend to perform better than non-accessible in terms of agency 
costs, equity costs, and financial and operating performance. Table 4 shows that 
accessible firms (measured by IR_ACS) have ORECA (EXPR) as much as 0.61% (0.06) 
lower than the non-accessible firms have. The cost of equity (COC) in accessible firms 
is about 1.31% at most (IR_ACS) and 0.65% at least (CALL_ACS) lower than that of 
non-accessible firms. The Tobin’s Q (TobinQ) of accessible firms is, on the average, 
about 0.2 higher than that of non-accessible firms. This means an improvement of about 
9% in firm valuation. Furthermore, the net profit margin (NOM) of accessible firms 
(measured by IR_ACS) is around 2.7 percentage points higher than that of 
non-accessible firms. Accessible firms also have higher ROA than non-accessible firms. 
These results are consistent with my hypothesis that accessible firms are associated with 
lower agency costs, lower costs of equity financing, higher firm valuation, and better 
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operating performance. 
I also examine firm characteristic differences between the two groups. I find that 
accessible firms are smaller in size (SIZE), have lower financial leverage (LEV), have 
lower volatility (VOL) in earnings, and have more liquidity in stock trading (ILLIQ). 
The negative association between financial leverage and accessibility is also consistent 
with the view that the firms who rely more on minority shareholders for fund-raising are 
more likely to provide investor relation services to investors (London Stock Exchange 
2010). 
 
4.2. The Determinants of Corporate Accessibility 
The regression results for the determinants of corporate accessibility as specified in 
equation 2 are presented in Table 5. As we can see from the table, the coefficients on 
STATE and CO are significantly negative. These results suggest that firms with an 
ownership structure that provides insiders more incentive to pursue profit maximization 
and high market valuation are more likely to be responsive to the communications 
initiated by minority shareholders. In addition, the coefficients on IO are significantly 
positive except in the last column (FORUM_ACS). However, in the last column, a 
significant positive coefficient for INDP is found, but there are no significant results in 
the other columns. Overall, these results suggest that firms facing strong monitoring are 
more likely to provide accessibility to outsiders.  
The coefficients on the two instrumental variables (D2004 and OCL) are highly 
significant. Firms listed after the year 2004 and located in a province with more optical 
line length are more likely to provide accessibility. At the bottom of the table, I report 
the results of the F-test on the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the IVs are jointly 
non-different from zero. I reject this hypothesis and conclude that D2004 and OCL are 
valid IVs for the measures of accessibility. The adjusted R-square also substantially 
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rises after the inclusion of the IVs as shown in the last second row. 
Firm characteristics such as firm size (SIZE), financial leverage (LEV), and 
volatility of earrings (VOL), are negatively associated with the provision of accessibility. 
Furthermore, the table shows that firms who are more profitable as measured by return 
on assets (ROA) are more likely to be responsive to the communications initiated by 
minority shareholders. The results are basically consistent with those in the previous 
T-test. Finally, the coefficients on the lambda that is computed from equation 1 are 
statistically significant. This suggests that it is necessary to consider a firm’s decision in 
setting the IR to correct the selection bias in the estimate of the determinants of 
accessibility and the association between accessibility and the measures of agency 
problems. 
 
4.3. Corporate Accessibility and Agency Problems 
4.3.1. Corporate Accessibility and Agency Costs 
Table 6 presents the results for the estimates of equation 3 that examines the 
association between corporate accessibility and agency costs controlling for governance 
factors and other firm characteristics. In Panel A, the explained variable is the expense 
ratio (EXPR). The measures of accessibility (IR_ACS, CALL_ACS, EMAIL_ACS, and 
FORUM_ACS) are significantly negatively associated with the expense ratio. This 
means accessible firms are associated with lower agency costs. In column 1, the 
coefficient on IR_ASC is negative 0.027, which means, on average, firms with at least 
one accessible communication channel have EXPR 0.027 lower than that of firms 
without any accessible communication channels. It is economically significant as it 
implies a 6.9% reduction in EXPR if we compare to the mean of 0.39. 
STATE and CO are positively associated with the expense ratio. These results are 
consistent with the literature that argues that firms ultimately owned by state and firms 
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with voting rights in excess of cash-flow rights are more likely to engage in self-dealing 
and other moral hazard activities (see, Lin et al. 2011a; Wei et al. 2005). Institutional 
ownership (IO), on the other hand, is negatively associated with the expense ratio. This 
is expected and consistent with the literature that states that institutional ownership 
exerts monitoring on managerial behaviors and thus inhibits moral hazard activities (see, 
Aggarwal et al. 2011; Chung and Zhang 2011).   
In Panel B, the explained variable is the other receivables scaled by total assets 
(ORECA), which measures firms’ “tunneling” activities through inter-corporate loans 
(Jiang et al. 2010). As expected, corporate accessibility is negatively associated with the 
amount of intra-group capital flows. Specifically, in column 5, the coefficient on 
IR_ACS is negative 0.269, which implies a 14.1% (0.27/1.91=0.141) reduction in 
ORECA for the accessible firms. An even larger reduction (0.531/1.91=27.8%) is 
implied for FORUM_ACS as shown in column 8. 
The findings on the coefficients of CO and IO are similar to those in Panel A. 
However, the negative association between STATE and ORECA is a surprise. Jiang et al. 
(2010) also has the same finding. One possible explanation for this negative relationship 
is that state owned firms tend to have better access to bank loans in China (Dinc 2005; 
Sapienza 2004). As a result, these companies tend to have a lower incentive to directly 
tunnel funds through inter-corporate loans. The results on the coefficients of SIZE and 
ROA are consistent with those in Jiang et al. (2010).   
Finally, there are no significant findings on INDP in both panels. A robustness 
check using a dummy variable (IND(>50%)) that takes the value of 1 if the number of 
independent directors exceeds one half of the total number of directors on the board, 
also shows no significant results. This could imply that independent directors are 
ineffective in monitoring agency costs. 
Overall, my results show that there is a signaling effect in which corporate 
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accessibility is significantly negative associated with the agency costs measured by 
EXPR and ORECA. This gives support to the argument that corporate accessibility is a 
signaling device to detect the agency problems of firms. 
 
4.3.2. Corporate Accessibility, Cost of Equity, and Firm Performance 
The regression estimates of equations 4 and 5 are reported in Table 7. The results 
examine the associations between corporate accessibility and cost of equity (firm 
performance). Panel A presents the coefficients estimated when COC is used as the 
dependent variable. The coefficient on IR_ACS is -0.438 which is statistically 
significant at the level of 1%. The coefficients for the other three accessibility measures 
range from -0.316 to -0.427 and are also highly significant. This means, holding all else 
constant, accessible firms on average have a cost of equity of about 0.4% lower than 
that of non-accessible firms. This is economically meaningful when compared to the 
COC mean of 5.91%.  
I expect there are two effects that shape the relationship between state ownership 
(STATE) and the cost of equity (COC). The first one is that state owned firms tend to 
have a close relationship with the state commercial banks, and thus find it much easier 
to acquire capital financing from the banks. This reduces their demand on financing 
from the equity market and thus reduces their cost of equity. The other effect is the 
governance effect. If state owned firms are plagued by more severe agency problems 
than are non-state firms, investors would require a higher rate of return to compensate 
for the governance risks borne, consequently raising the cost of equity. The negative 
coefficients on the measures of accessibility suggest that the first effect appears to be 
more significant. I also find a negative association between institutional ownership (IO) 
and cost of equity (COC) but the coefficients on control-ownership wedge (CO) and 
director independence (INDP) are not significant. In addition, higher financial leverage 
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and volatility in earnings are shown to be associated with higher cost of equity. These 
results are reasonable as higher financial leverage and more volatile earnings are 
associated with higher firm operating risks and thus higher cost of equity. 
In panel B, the dependent variable is TobinQ, a measure of firm value. The 
coefficients on the accessibility measures are both statistically and economically 
significant. On average, the TobinQ in accessible firms range from 0.092 to 0.165 
higher than the TobinQ in non-accessible firms. This means a relative improvement in 
valuation ranging from 0.43% to 7.6% (the mean of TobinQ is 2.16). The results are 
consistent with my hypothesis that accessible firms enjoy a higher valuation than 
non-accessible firms. In addition, as expected, state ownership (STATE) and 
control-ownership wedge (CO) are negatively associated with firm valuation, and 
institutional ownership (IO) is positively associated with firm valuation, while there are 
no significant results for INDP. Lastly, firms that are small in size and low in financial 
leverage are associated with higher valuation. 
The regression results on the association between corporate accessibility and firm 
operating performance measured by NOM are reported in Panel C. The coefficients on 
the accessibility measures are statistically significant and positive in sign. NOM in 
accessible firms in terms of IR_ACS is around 0.91% higher than that in non-accessible 
firms. It is economically significant as compared to the NOM mean of 7.67%. State 
ownership (STATE) is shown to detract from a firm’s operating performance. However, 
the negative association between IO and NOM is unexpected. Finally, firms with large 
size and low earnings volatility are associated with superior operating performance.  
Overall, the results show that accessible firms are associated a with lower cost of 
equity and better corporate performance (higher firm valuation and superior operating 
performance). This confirms the existence of a signaling effect where accessible firms 
suffer less severe agency problems and thus perform better than non-accessible firms. In 
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addition, the significant results on the ownership and corporate governance structures 
suggest that they are effective, to some extent, in detecting agency problems. This 
means there is a need to further examine how the signaling effects vary with these 
structures and whether corporate accessibility has incremental predictive power in firms 
with different ownership and corporate governance structures. 
 
4.4. Ownership and Governance Structures and The Signaling Effects of 
Corporate Accessibility 
4.4.1. Examining the Signaling Effects Using Portfolio Sort Analysis 
Table 8 reports the T-test results on the mean difference of agency costs using the 
portfolio sort technique. In Panel A, the outcome variable is EXPR. The results show 
that the differences between accessible firms and non-accessible firms are generally 
significantly negative regardless of the governance structure. This confirms the general 
existence of the signaling effects of corporate accessibility. However, the spreads appear 
to diminish in state owned firms and in firms with high divergence between control 
rights and cash-flow rights, which is consistent with H2a. For example, the spread of 
EXPR between ACS and Non_ACS (IR_ACS) in the NON_STATE firms is -0.071, 
which is statistically significant, while the spread contracts to -0.028 in the STATE firms. 
Similarly, the spread is significant at -0.078 in the Low CO firms, but it declines to 
-0.028 in the High CO firms. In addition, the results show that the spreads are 
strengthened in firms with higher institutional ownership and larger placement of 
independent directors. This is consistent with H2b. For example, in the second column 
(CALL_ACS), the difference is -0.022 in the Low IO firms, while it expands to -0.043 in 
the High IO firms. In Panel B, the outcome variable is ORECA. Similarly, I find that 
accessible firms generally have a lower ORECA than do non-accessible firms, and the 
spreads become less significant in the STATE and High CO firms but more significant in 
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High IO and High INDP firms. 
Table 9 reports the results of the T-test on the mean differences of corporate 
performance between accessible firms and non-accessible firms under different 
governance circumstances. In Panel A, the outcome variable is cost of equity (COC). 
The spreads between ACS and Non_ACS are generally significant with negative signs, 
suggesting lower costs of external financing for accessible firms than for non-accessible 
firms. The magnitude of the spreads is smaller in the STATE firms and High CO firms 
than that in the NON-STATE and Low CO firms. This is consistent with H2a. For 
example, in the first column (IR_ACS), the spread of COC in the STATE firm sample is 
-0.729, which is much smaller in magnitude than that (-2.052) in the NON-STATE firm 
sample. In addition, the spreads in the High IO firm sample have magnitude larger than 
those in the Low IO firm sample. This is consistent with H2b. However, the results 
appear to be mixed for INDP. 
In Panel B and Panel C, the outcome variables are TobinQ and NOM, respectively. 
The results are generally consistent with my expectation that the mean differences of 
TobinQ (NOM) between accessible firms and non-accessible firms are significantly 
positive, and become weaker in the STATE firms and High CO firms but stronger in the 
High IO and High INDP. For instance, in the first column (IR_ACS), the mean 
difference of TobinQ (NOM) between ACS and Non_ACS is -0.053 (-2.1) in the STATE 
firm sample, which is 0.182 (0.39) lower than that in the NON_STATE firm sample.  
Overall, the results of the portfolio sort analysis confirm the general existence of 
the signaling effects of corporate accessibility under different governance circumstances. 
The strength of the signaling effects varies with the ownership structures and corporate 
governance characteristics, and the results are consistent with H2a and H2b.  
 
4.4.2. Examining the Signaling Effects Using Regression Analysis 
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Table 10 reports the results of the regression analysis in examining the signaling 
effects of corporate accessibility on the agency costs measured by ORECA. To save 
space, I do not report the coefficients on the firm characteristics and other control 
variables (this set of variable is denoted as X). The coefficients on the accessibility 
measures continue to be significantly negative, suggesting that accessible firms are 
associated with lower agency costs. The coefficients on ACS*STATE and ACS*CO are 
significantly positive. For example, in column 1, the coefficients of ACS*STATE and 
ACS*CO are 0.611 and 0.281, respectively. The results mean that STATE and CO 
weaken the negative association between accessibility and ORECA, and are thus 
consistent with H2a. However, this does not mean the disappearance of the signaling 
effects. At the bottom of the table, the results show that the marginal effects of corporate 
accessibility at the 80% percentile of STATE and CO are significantly negative (-0.230 
and -0.249, respectively), although they are smaller in absolute magnitude than those at 
the 20% percentile. In addition, the negative coefficients on ACS*IO and ACS*INDP 
suggest that institutional ownership and independent directors strengthen the signaling 
effects (consistent with H2b), but the results are not statistically significant. The results 
of the marginal tests (20%, 80% comparisons) are also consistent with the hypothesis. 
In Table 11, the explained variable is the agency costs measured by EXPR. In general, 
the findings are similar to those in Table 10. The estimated coefficients on the 
interaction terms are consistent with H2a and H2b. The results on the marginal tests are 
also consistent with the two hypotheses. Lastly, the coefficients on the standalone 
accessibility variables are significantly negative. However, the coefficients on the 
standalone governance variables become less significant as compared with those in the 
previous Table 6. 
Table 12 presents the results on the regression analysis in examining the signaling 
effects when the explained variable is cost of equity (COC). The coefficients on the 
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standalone accessibility variables are significantly negative. For example, it is -1.159 
and significant at the level of 1% in column 1 where the accessibility measure is 
IR_ACS. Significant positive coefficients are shown on ACS*STATE and ACS*CO, and 
negative coefficients on ACS*IO. The marginal effects of corporate accessibility are 
generally significantly negative. The effects are weaker when STATE and CO are at the 
80% percentile, but stronger when IO is at the 80% percentile. The results suggest that 
accessible firms are generally associated with lower costs of external financing than for 
non-accessible firms, but the association varies with ownership and governance 
characteristics.  
In Table 13 and Table 14, the explained variables are TobinQ and NOM, 
respectively. The coefficients on the standalone accessibility variables are highly 
significantly positive. This confirms that accessible firms are associated with higher 
firm value and better operating performance. The association is weakened by the state 
ownership and the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights as evidenced 
by the significant negative coefficients on ACS*STATE and ACS*CO, while it is 
strengthened by the institutional ownership as evidenced by the significant positive 
coefficients on ACS*IO. The coefficients on ACS*INDP are positive, but they lack 
significance. These results are confirmed by those in the marginal effect tests, which 
show that the marginal effects of corporate accessibility is significantly positive on firm 
value and operating performance but the effects are diminished (increased) when STATE 
and CO ( IO and INDP) are at the 80% percentile. 
 
In conclusion, the results of the regression anylyses confirm with the existence of 
the signaling effects that corporate accessibility is associated with lower agency costs, 
lower external financing costs, higher firm value, and superior operating performance.  
The results also suggest that the signaling effects vary with ownership and governance 
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structure characteristics. Specifically, the effects become weaker in firms with state 
ownership and high divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights than in 
firms with non-state ownership and low control-ownership wedge, and the effects 
become stronger in firm with high institutional ownership and a large proportion of 
independent directors than in firms with low institutional ownership and a small 
proportion of independent directors.  
 
4.5. Robustness Tests 
4.5.1. The Endogenetiy of Corproate Accessibility 
I have used the Heckmand approach to capture the unobservable factors that drive 
the firms into accessible versus non-accessible firms. Nevertheless, my estimations on 
the relations between corporate accessibility and the pefromance variables may still be 
plagued by the omission of some relevant variables. There is a possibility that the 
performance variables are inversely affect corporate accessibility. Under these 
circumstances, my estimates would be biased and inconsistent. I attempt to mitigate 
these concerns by employing instrumental variables to re-estimate the models. 
I use OCL and D2004 as my IVs whose validity have been discussed previousely 
and run a probit model with corporate accessibility measures as the dependent variables. 
I include the same set of control variables as used in previous regressions (the first 
stage). Then I use the fitted value of corporate accessibility as an explanatory variable 
and re-estimate equation 3-4 (the second stage). The results are reported in Table 15. 
In Panel A, I present the test statistics about the validity of my instrumental 
variables. The results show that the over-identifying statistics (nR2) are not significant 
in any one of the four models. Thus I do not reject that null hypothesis that the 
instruments adopted are exogenous. In addition, the Hausman test statistics are weakly 
significant, indicating that the instrumental variables estimators are more efficient than 
44 
 
the OLS estimators. Overall, the tests suggest that two instruments OCL and D2004 are 
valid.  
The results of the second stage are reported in panel B. To save space, I only report 
the coefficients on the experimental variables. The coefficients for each measure of 
corporate accessibility are still significant. Though the significance level of the 
coefficients is reduced to some extent, the results are still robust at the normal 
significance levels. For ORECA and TobinQ, the magnitudes of the new coefficients are 
even larger than those obtained without the use of IVs. Overall, the results of the IV 
method are robust and consistent with our prior analysis. 
 
4.5.2. Controlling for More Governance Variables and Regional Dummies 
I have demonstrated that the signaling effects of corporate accessibility exist after 
controlling the key corporate governance variables of state ownership, 
control-ownership wedge, institutional ownership, and indepdendent directors. 
Neverthesless, previous studies have shown that other corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as manageirial shareholding, board of directors, auditors, and 
financial analysts, may also generate monitoring effects on insiders. Furthermore, it is 
possible that accessible firms tend to have lower agency costs and better performance 
because they are located in different regions where legal and market developments are 
different. To deal with these concerns, I control for a set of additional governance 
variables and also include regional dummies in my models (RegEst—east of China, 
RegMid—middle of China, RegNE—north east of China, others belong to west of 
China). I re-estimate equation 3-5, and the the results are presented in Tabel 16. 
The results show that the coefficients on IR_ACS are significant and they are very 
close to the estimates without the inclusion of the control variables. This implies that the 
quality of corporate governance and the regional effects do not distort my results on the 
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accociation between accessibility and agency costs. 
  
4.5.3. Is the Existence of an IR Section a Signal of Agency Problems? 
In this section, I examine whether the mere existence of an IR section and related 
information released in the section on a company website is a value-relevant signal of 
the severity of agency problems. I use three such kinds of variables: WIR—a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has IR section and 0 otherwise; WIR_FRs—a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm provides financial information in the 
IR section and 0 otherwise; and WIR_Ann—a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if a firm releases firm news in the IR section and 0 otherwise. I use those variables to 
separately replace the corporate accessibility measures and re-estimate Equations 3-5.  
The results of the analysis of equations 3-5 (unreported) show that the coefficients 
on the three IR variables estimated are generally not statistically significant. The results 
suggest that, unlike corporate accessibility, the mere existence of the IR section and 
related information in the section is not a good signal of agency costs and corporate 
performance.  
 
4.5.4. Other Robustness Tests 
In my previous analysis, I assume that corporate accessibility persists over the 
period of 2008-2010. However, one may argue that the 3-year period is too long and the 
persistency assumption may not be held. To mitigate this concern, I re-do the analysis 
based on a shorter period time from 2009 to 2010, and the year of 2010 alone. However, 
the results are largely the same as before. 
I also estimate lagged and median regressions. In the lagged regression, the 
dependent variables at time t are matched with independent variables at time t-1. To 
avoid extreme observations that might distort my results, I also run the regressions 
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using the median values of the variables. Though the results become less significant, 
they are still robust at the normal significance levels and their signs are consistent with 
my previous analyses.  
Lastly, I also run regressions with alternative definitions of variables. For example, 
I estimate the cost of equity using Gebhardt et al. (2001)’s residual income model and 
Claus and Thomas (2001)’s abnormal earnings model, use the book to market ratio 
(book value of total assets/(market value of equity+net debts)) to measure a firm’s 
relative value, and use return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) to measure a 
firm’s operating performance. The results from these alternative specifications are 
similar to the results reported earlier. These robustness tests thus confirm my main 
research findings.   
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
Nowadays, more and more publicly listed firms state that they have set up facilities 
such as emails and phone lines for minority shareholders to contact corporate insiders. 
However, I find that many firms do not provide real accessibility for minority 
shareholders. I examine whether corporate accessibility, defined as the ease with which 
minority shareholders are able to contact corporate insiders, can be a signal for the 
severity of a firm’s agency problems. I measure corporate accessibility by directly 
contacting the listed firms via the contact information provided by the IR section on a 
firm’s website.  
Based on a sample of Chinese listed firms during the period from 2008 to 2010, I 
analyze the determinants of corporate accessibility, and find that firms with an 
ownership structure where the interests of corporate insiders are tied closely with the 
movement of share prices are more likely to provide accessibility. I then address the 
existence of the signaling effects by examining the association between corporate 
accessibility and measures of agency costs and firm performance. The results show that 
accessible firms are associated with less agency costs, lower costs of external financing, 
higher firm valuation, and superior operating performance than non-accessible firms. In 
addition, I examine how the signaling effects vary with ownership structures and 
corporate governance characteristics. I find that the signaling effects generally exist 
under different governance conditions but the effects are weaker in state owned firms 
and in firms with a high divergence between control rights and cash flow rights than in 
non-state owned firms and in firms with a low control-ownership wedge. The effects 
become stronger in firms with high institutional ownership and larger proportion of 
independent directors than in firm with low institutional ownership and lower 
proportion of independent directors. Finally, the signaling effects are robust after I 
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control for additional governance and regional effects. 
Overall, my results suggest that corporate accessibility is systematically associated 
with the severity of agency problems, and could be a value-relevant signal to help 
investors, especially minority shareholders to make inferences about the agency 
problems that plague listed firms in China. 
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Definitions of Variables
Variables Definitions/Descriptions
IR_ACS
CALL_ACS A dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if the communication channel by phone is accessible, and 0 otherwise.
EMAIL_ACS A dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if the communication channel by email is accessible, and 0 otherwise.
FORUM_ACS A dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if the communication channel by online discussion forum is accessible, and 0 otherwise.
EXPR
ORECA Other account receivables scaled by total assets.
COC The ex ante or implied cost of equity capital which is calculated based on the Easton (2003) modified PEG ratio model.
TobinQ (Market value of equity +  net debt) / (total assets - net intangible assets)
NOM Net profit/operating revenue
STATE
CO The ratio of a ultimate controlling shareholder's voting rights over its cash-flow ownership rights.
IO Percentage of shares owned by institutional investors.
INDP The number of independent directors over the number of directors on the board.
SIZE The logarithm of total market capitalization.
LEV The ratio of long-term debts over total assets.
VOL The standard deviation of the earnings per share in the past five years.
ILLIQ The annual average ratio of the daily absolute stock return to the trading volume (in 100 millions) on that day. 
ROA (Total profit + financial expenses)/total assets)
AdjRet Lagged market-adjusted annual stock return of a firm
D2004 A dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if the listing year is 2005 or after, and 0 otherwise.
OCL The length of optical cable line in the province where the company is located.
WIR A dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if a firm has an IR section, and 0 otherwise.
WIR_FRs A dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if a firm provides financial reports information in the IR section, and 0 otherwise.
WIR_Ann A dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if a firm releases firm news in the IR section, and 0 otherwise.
Mgt_Hld The number of shares held by managers over the total number of shares outstanding.
BOARD The logarithm of the number of directors on the board.
MEETING The logarithm of the number of board meetings.
BIG4 A dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if foreign Big 4 auditors are employed, and 0 otherwise.
COVERAGE The logarithm of the number of analysts following the company's stock.
RegEst A dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if the registry province located in the east of China.
RegMid A dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if the registry province located in the middle of China.
RegNE A dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if the registry province located in the north east of China.
Table 1
A dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if at least one of the three communication channels (phone, email, forum) is accessible, and 0 otherwise.
A dummy variable,  that takes the value of 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder is in the nature of government ownership based on the "Classification Standard
for Related Party Nature" in CSMAR, and 0 otherwise.
The expense ratio, that is operating expense (total expenses less cost of goods sold, interest expense, and managerial compensation) scaled by annual sales.
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Sample Descriptive Statistics
Sample
Investor Relation
Communications
Exist
Accessible
Variables N Mean Std. dev. Minimum 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl. Maximum
IR_ACS 4247 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
CALL_ACS 4247 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
EMAIL_ACS 4247 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
FORUM_ACS 4247 0.17 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
ORECA  (%) 4247 1.91 2.75 0.02 0.39 0.94 2.16 16.77
EXPR 4247 0.39 0.35 0.04 0.15 0.28 0.49 1.88
COC  (%) 3046 5.91 3.38 0.60 2.95 4.50 7.27 27.82
TobinQ 4247 2.16 0.95 0.81 1.28 1.78 2.47 5.43
NOM  (%) 4247 7.67 12.80 -31.06 2.05 6.14 12.97 45.26
CO 4247 1.36 0.70 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.43 4.90
STATE 4247 0.54 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
IO 4247 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.30
INDP 4247 0.36 0.05 0.25 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.57
SIZE 4247 22.21 1.09 19.85 21.48 22.08 22.78 26.37
LEV 4247 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.80
VOL 4247 0.21 0.22 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.28 1.18
ILLIQ 4247 0.12 0.25 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.11 5.25
ROA  (%) 4247 6.48 5.87 -19.46 3.38 5.98 9.39 27.37
AdjRet 4247 -0.01 0.79 -1.77 -0.41 -0.07 0.19 5.51
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
EXPR 0.63 0.47 0.28 0.21 0.29 0.26
ORECA  (%) 2.26 3.29 1.81 2.62 1.66 2.34
COC  (%) 10.94 7.09 3.91 2.03 4.54 2.72
TobinQ 1.33 0.39 2.27 0.88 2.35 1.03
NOM  (%) 6.01 11.12 8.20 11.26 9.84 9.68
Number of firms
Total observations
Table 2
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of accessibility measures in 2010, number (percentage)
Number of companies surveyed: 1555
Companies equipped with investor relation subpages: 1042 (67%)
PHONE EMAIL FORUM IR
888 (85.2% ) 670 (64.3%) 295 (28.3%) 971 (93.2%)
173 (19.5%) 99 (14.8%) 252 (85.4%) 398 (41%)
4247
Panel B: Descriptive statistics on pooled sample (2008-2010)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics of key variables by year 
2008 2009 2010
1283 1409 1555
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Table 3
Correlation Matrix
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
IR_ACS  0.37***  0.28***  0.21***  -0.19***  -0.03**  0.03** 0.02  -0.01  -0.07***
CALL_ACS 1  0.13***  0.24***  -0.16***  -0.02*  0.04***  0.01  -0.08***  -0.09***
EMAIL_ACS 1  0.02*  -0.14***  -0.02*  0.02** 0.01  -0.03***  -0.06***
FORUM_ACS 1  -0.15***  -0.04***  -0.02*  0.03***  0.02**  -0.07***
STATE 1  -0.18***  0.01  0.05***  0.17***  0.2***
CO 1  0.04***  -0.03***  -0.07***  -0.01
IO 1  -0.02  0.26***  -0.06***
INDP 1  0.11***  0.01
SIZE 1  0.16***
LEV 1
Variable (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
IR_ACS  0.01  0.01  0.13***  -0.03*  -0.09***  -0.07***  -0.08***  0.06***  0.09***
CALL_ACS  -0.02* -0.03***  0.1***  0.01  -0.03***  -0.04***  -0.04***  0.08***  0.05***
EMAIL_ACS  0.02*  0.02  0.09***  -0.03*  -0.08***  -0.05***  -0.08***  0.03***  0.05***
FORUM_ACS  -0.03**  -0.02**  0.1***  -0.04**  -0.06***  -0.09***  -0.03***  0.06***  0.09***
STATE  0.05***  0  -0.15***  -0.02  -0.05***  0.2***  0.06***  -0.21***  -0.05***
CO  -0.03*  0.01  -0.01  0.01  0.04***  0.04***  0.01  -0.02*  -0.03***
IO  0.05***  0.02*  0.3***  0.01  -0.03***  0.02*  0.05***  0.22***  0.13***
INDP  -0.02  0.01  0.01  -0.01  0.03***  0.04***  0.01  -0.04***  -0.01
SIZE  0.2***  0.13***  0.27***  0.04***  -0.13***  -0.21***  -0.06***  0.1***  0.33***
LEV  0.1***  0.02*  -0.08***  0  -0.07***  0.01  0.12***  -0.25***  -0.03**
VOL 1  0.03**  0.03*  0.05**  -0.06***  0.01  0.18***  -0.07***  0.01
ILLIQ 1  0.03***  0.03*  -0.04***  -0.09***  -0.09***  0.11***  0.02*
ROA 1  0.06***  -0.12***  -0.21***  -0.06***  0.26***  0.61***
AdjRet 1  0.03*  -0.08***  0.13***  0.08***  0.01
ORECA 1  0.04***  -0.02  0.06***  -0.09***
EXPR 1  0.36***  -0.44***  -0.22***
COC 1  -0.41***  -0.03**
TobinQ 1  0.08***
NOM 1
    This table presents the correlation between the variables used in this study. All other variables are defined in
Table 1. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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Table 4
Corporate Accessibility and Firm Characteristics-Univariate Analysis
Variable Non_ACS ACS Diff Non_ACS ACS Diff Non_ACS ACS Diff Non_ACS ACS Diff
STATE  0.668  0.478 -0.190***  0.614  0.456  -0.158***  0.617  0.478  -0.139***  0.583  0.389  -0.193***
CO  1.372  1.353 -0.019**  1.370  1.347 -0.023**  1.372  1.349 -0.023*  1.372  1.300  -0.072***
IO  0.049  0.051 0.002*  0.049  0.052  0.003**  0.049  0.051 0.002*  0.050  0.048 -0.002
INDP  0.362  0.364 0.002  0.364  0.363     -0.001  0.363  0.364      0.001  0.363  0.365      0.002
SIZE  22.223  22.212     -0.011  22.290  22.108  -0.181***  22.252  22.177  -0.075***  22.204  22.274  0.070*
LEV  0.078  0.063  -0.015***  0.075  0.059  -0.016***  0.074  0.063  -0.012***  0.072  0.053  -0.019***
VOL  0.230  0.235  0.006  0.247  0.226  -0.022**  0.231  0.243  0.012  0.244  0.218  -0.026***
ILLIQ  0.183  0.281      0.099  0.316  0.119  -0.197**  0.160  0.318      0.157  0.271  0.125  -0.146**
ROA  5.402  6.926  1.524***  5.880  7.035  1.155***  5.950  6.780  0.829***  6.058  7.791  1.733***
ORECA  2.279  1.665  2.003  1.746  2.141  1.635  2.105  1.467  -0.638***
EXPR  0.434  0.375  0.409  0.381  0.417  0.376  0.414  0.315  -0.099***
COC  6.773  5.467  6.195  5.544  6.435  5.405  6.049  5.383  -0.666***
TobinQ  1.882  2.087  1.926  2.133  1.946  2.078  1.976  2.179  0.203***
NOM  6.348  9.041  7.496  8.793  7.142  8.974  7.399  11.103  3.705***
 0.205***  0.207***  0.132***
 2.692***  1.297***  1.833***
 -0.060***  -0.028***  -0.042***
 -1.307***  -0.652***  -1.030***
 -0.614***  -0.257***  -0.506***
    This table present the results of the mean differences between the accessible and non-accessible firms. I divide the sample into two groups based on the accessibility
measures (IR_ACS , CALL_ACS , EMAIL_ACS , and FORUM_ACS ). One group includes firms that do not respond to the communications initiated by outsiders (Non_ACS,
non-accessible group), and the other one includes firms that respond to the communications initiated by outsiders (ACS, accessible). I then conduct a T-test on the mean
difference of the two groups. The difference using ACS minus Non_ACS is reported in the column denoted with Diff. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by
*, **, and ***, respectively.
IR_ACS CALL_ACS EMAIL_ACS FORUM_ACS
53 
 
Table 5
The Determinants of Corporate Accessibility
IR_ACS CALL_ACS EMAIL_ACS FORUM_ACS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
STATE -1.617*** -1.414*** -0.835*** -0.965***
( 31.13) ( 29.52) ( 11.04) ( 12.44)
CO -0.279*** -0.266*** -0.113** -0.174**
( 19.95) ( 21.34) ( 4.24) ( 5.55)
IO 2.640*** 2.209*** 2.290***   1.210
( 12.83) ( 9.94) ( 10.91) ( 1.97)
INDP  0.601  -0.255  0.379  0.934*
( 1.35) ( 0.27) ( 0.63) ( 2.94)
SIZE -0.357**  -0.285  -0.152 -0.602***
( 5.95) ( 1.84) ( 1.75) ( 15.13)
LEV  -0.782***  -0.352  -0.873***  -0.945***
( 8.49) ( 1.74) ( 10.23) ( 8.85)
VOL  -0.365***  -0.364***  -0.105  -0.315**
( 7.53) ( 8.89) ( 0.76) ( 5.14)
ILLIQ  -0.092  -1.548  2.838  -3.574
( 0.31) ( 0.82) ( 1.42) ( 1.78)
ROA  0.013**  0.015**  0.010*  0.012*
( 5.53) ( 6.54) ( 3.34) ( 3.89)
D2004 1.369*** 0.69*** 0.628*** 1.047***
( 78.15) ( 13.02) ( 11.37) ( 27.46)
OCL 12.021*** 6.606*** 7.669*** 4.408***
( 55.23) ( 19.59) ( 27.82) ( 8.13)
lambda  (from WIR ) 2.741*** 2.362*** 2.191*** 1.869**
( 15.97) ( 12.51) ( 11.26) ( 6.10)
Intercept -1.610*** -1.814*** -1.873*** -1.932***
( 18.12) ( 24.28) ( 26.65) ( 21.71)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2, R2[with IVs]  14.21%, 17.31%  10.57%, 11.43%  6.99%, 8.05%  11.00%, 12.40%
Wald, Wald[IVs=0]  491.5*** , 70.6***  307.7*** , 27.0***  208.4*** , 31.6***  316.0*** , 29.0***
     This table presents regression results on the analysis of the determinants of corporate accessibility using a probit
model. The dependent variable is IR_ACS  in (1), CALL_ACS  in (2), EMAIL_ACS  in (3), and FORUM_ACS  in (4). All
variables are defined in Table 1. The sample consists of 4247 firm-year observations covering the period of 2008-2010.
Wald chi-square statistics are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is  indicated by *,
**,and ***, respectively.
54 
 
Table 6
Agency Costs and Corporate Accessibility 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IR_ACS  -0.027**  -0.269***
( -2.11) ( -3.53)
CALL_ACS  -0.034**  -0.131**
( -2.45) ( -2.12)
EMAIL_ACS  -0.032**  -0.205***
( -2.39) ( -2.78)
FORUM_ACS  -0.044***  -0.531***
( -3.75) ( -5.28)
STATE  0.093***  0.092***  0.093***  0.088***  -0.383***  -0.357***  -0.360***  -0.422***
( 6.16) ( 6.11) ( 6.22) ( 5.39) ( -4.73) ( -4.42) ( -4.47) ( -5.19)
CO  0.023***  0.022***  0.023***  0.021***  0.086*  0.085*  0.093*  0.076
( 3.53) ( 3.47) ( 3.54) ( 3.27) ( 1.70) ( 1.68) ( 1.83) ( 1.50)
IO  -0.278***  -0.275***  -0.277***  -0.285***  -1.431*  -1.419*  -1.419*  -1.570**
( -3.17) ( -3.14) ( -3.16) ( -3.26) ( -1.91) ( -1.89) ( -1.89) ( -2.10)
INDP  0.084  0.081  0.082  0.081  0.371  0.374  0.385  0.347
( 1.56) ( 1.53) ( 1.57) ( 1.52) ( 1.47) ( 1.39) ( 1.51) ( 1.37)
SIZE  0.016***  0.016***  0.016***  0.015***  -0.160***  -0.158***  -0.160***  -0.157***
( 2.94) ( 2.85) ( 2.91) ( 2.78) ( -3.36) ( -3.29) ( -3.34) ( -3.31)
LEV  0.100**  0.099**  0.099**  0.091**  -1.125***  -1.089***  -1.105***  -1.210***
( 2.43) ( 2.42) ( 2.43) ( 2.21) ( -3.11) ( -3.01) ( -3.06) ( -3.35)
VOL  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.155  -0.169  -0.153  -0.186
( -0.08) ( -0.05) ( -0.06) ( -0.05) ( -1.18) ( -1.28) ( -1.15) ( -1.42)
ILLIQ  -1.296**  -1.299**  -1.291**  -1.346***  -2.926  -3.187  -2.912  -3.522
( -2.53) ( -2.53) ( -2.52) ( -2.63) ( -0.99) ( -1.08) ( -0.99) ( -1.20)
ROA  -0.008***  -0.008***  -0.008***  -0.008***  -0.017**  -0.017**  -0.017**  -0.016**
( -8.57) ( -8.53) ( -8.55) ( -8.38) ( -2.08) ( -2.15) ( -2.08) ( -1.99)
lambda  0.027*  0.029*  0.028*  0.039**  -0.322**  -0.401***  -0.375***  -0.282**
( 1.68) ( 1.81) ( 1.74) ( 2.44) ( -2.27) ( -2.87) ( -2.68) ( -2.00)
Intercept  -0.135  -0.123  -0.131  -0.107  7.580***  7.457***  7.503***  7.496***
( -1.09) ( -0.99) ( -1.06) ( -0.87) ( 7.14) ( 6.99) ( 7.06) ( 7.09)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj Rsq 12.42% 12.44% 12.43% 12.75% 11.68% 11.46% 11.57% 12.03%
    This table presents the regression results on the analysis of the association between agency costs and corporate
accessibility. The dependent variables are EXPR  in Panel A, and ORECA  in Panel B. All variables are defined in
Table 1. The sample consists of 4247 firm-year observations covering the period of 2008-2010. The t statistics are
reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Panel A: EXPR Panel B: ORECA
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Table 7 
Corporate Performance and Corporate Accessibility 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
IR_ACS  -0.438***  0.132***  0.910***
( -5.01) ( 4.44) ( 4.14)
CALL_ACS  -0.316***  0.140***  0.435**
( -3.65) ( 4.73) ( 1.99)
EMAIL_ACS  -0.427***  0.092***  0.628***
( -5.10) ( 3.17) ( 2.95)
FORUM_ACS  -0.412***  0.165***  1.110***
( -3.74) ( 4.15) ( 3.83)
STATE  -0.268***  -0.233**  -0.237***  -0.258***  -0.274***  -0.277***  -0.285***  -0.272***  -0.434*  -0.524**  -0.521**  -0.412*
( -2.87) ( -2.51) ( -2.57) ( -2.74) ( -4.67) ( -4.85) ( -5.18) ( -4.54) ( -1.87) ( -2.26) ( -2.26) ( -1.76)
CO  0.004  0.003  0.013  -0.001  -0.124***  -0.121***  -0.127***  -0.123***  0.111  0.108  0.087  0.115
( 0.07) ( 0.05) ( 0.22) ( -0.02) ( -4.27) ( -4.15) ( -4.44) ( -4.22) ( 0.76) ( 0.74) ( 0.60) ( 0.79)
IO  -3.960***  -3.968***  -3.955***  -4.161***  4.140***  4.139***  4.151***  4.204***  -7.533***  -7.429***  -7.506***  -7.183***
( -4.79) ( -4.79) ( -4.79) ( -5.03) ( 7.10) ( 7.11) ( 7.12) ( 7.32) ( -3.27) ( -3.22) ( -3.26) ( -3.12)
INDP  0.518  0.467  0.544  0.495  -0.147  -0.127  -0.149  -0.138  -0.854  -0.783  -0.879  -0.800
( 1.46) ( 1.31) ( 1.59) ( 1.42) ( -1.51) ( -1.31) ( -1.53) ( -1.41) ( -1.22) ( -1.11) ( -1.25) ( -1.14)
SIZE  0.502***  0.500***  0.496***  0.509***  -0.175***  -0.176***  -0.178***  -0.183***  1.226***  1.179***  1.204***  1.181***
( 6.59) ( 6.51) ( 6.45) ( 6.71) ( -3.82) ( -3.85) ( -3.90) ( -3.09) ( 3.52) ( 3.30) ( 3.41) ( 3.33)
LEV  3.945***  3.981***  3.955***  3.919***  -1.865***  -1.878***  -1.876***  -1.855***  3.648  3.534  3.576  3.766*
( 6.62) ( 6.69) ( 6.65) ( 6.53) ( -8.75) ( -8.86) ( -8.82) ( -8.66) ( 1.57) ( 1.45) ( 1.49) ( 1.67)
VOL  1.492***  1.457***  1.475***  1.448***  -0.031  -0.027  -0.028  -0.015  -0.867**  -0.793**  -0.851**  -0.771**
( 4.54) ( 4.36) ( 4.46) ( 4.32) ( -0.60) ( -0.53) ( -0.55) ( -0.29) ( -2.26) ( -2.07) ( -2.22) ( -2.02)
ILLIQ  -29.503***  -30.328***  -29.831***  -30.300***  4.438***  4.494***  4.419***  4.525***  -3.003  -2.747  -3.118  -2.435
( -5.05) ( -5.19) ( -5.11) ( -5.18) ( 3.27) ( 3.35) ( 3.23) ( 3.39) ( -0.56) ( -0.52) ( -0.59) ( -0.46)
AdjRet  0.119**  0.118**  0.119**  0.118**  0.066*  0.066*  0.066  0.067  0.010  0.009  0.012  0.032
( 2.14) ( 2.07) ( 2.13) ( 2.01) ( 1.83) ( 1.77) ( 1.60) ( 1.62) ( 0.39) ( 0.47) ( 0.40) ( 0.45)
lambda  0.398**  0.298*  0.334**  0.330*  -0.155***  -0.137**  -0.126**  -0.143***  0.566  0.829**  0.771*  0.634
( 2.34) ( 1.78) ( 2.00) ( 1.95) ( -2.79) ( -2.52) ( -2.31) ( -2.59) ( 1.38) ( 2.05) ( 1.90) ( 1.55)
Intercept  -7.012***  -7.037***  -6.913***  -7.252***  6.305***  6.328***  6.406***  6.507***  -23.613***  -22.302***  -22.873***  -22.368***
( -5.89) ( -5.89) ( -5.80) ( -6.09) ( 5.40) ( 5.45) ( 5.53) ( 5.75) ( -4.77) ( -4.50) ( -4.62) ( -4.54)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj Rsq 20.78% 20.48% 20.80% 20.50% 28.77% 28.83% 28.58% 28.73% 29.73% 29.58% 29.64% 29.70%
    The dependent variable is COC  in Panel A, TobinQ  in Panel B, and NOM  in panel C. All variables are defined in Table 1. The sample consists of 4247 (3046 for COC ) firm-year observations
covering the period of 2008-2010. The t statistics are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Panel A: COC Panel B: TobinQ Panel C: NOM
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Table 8
Examining The Signaling Effects On Agency Costs Using Portfolio Sort Analysis
Non_ACS ACS Diff Non_ACS ACS Diff Non_ACS ACS Diff Non_ACS ACS Diff
NON-STATE Low  0.369  0.298  -0.071***  0.327  0.306  -0.021**  0.337  0.293  -0.044***  0.328  0.267  -0.061***
STATE High  0.469  0.441  -0.028**  0.463  0.451   -0.012*  0.468  0.445  -0.023**  0.475  0.391  -0.084***
CO Low  0.442  0.364  -0.078***  0.412  0.369  -0.043***  0.410  0.362  -0.048***  0.417  0.309  -0.108***
CO High  0.421  0.393  -0.028**  0.397  0.394  -0.003  0.426  0.391  -0.035**  0.412  0.352  -0.060**
IO Low  0.437  0.387  -0.050***  0.415  0.393  -0.022**  0.424  0.388  -0.036***  0.420  0.332  -0.089***
IO High  0.427  0.342  -0.085***  0.393  0.350  -0.043***  0.402  0.343  -0.059***  0.396  0.276  -0.120***
INDP Low  0.429  0.375  -0.053***  0.406  0.380  -0.026**  0.416  0.373  -0.043***  0.412  0.316  -0.096***
INDP High  0.445  0.374  -0.071***  0.414  0.381  -0.033**  0.420  0.380  -0.040***  0.418  0.313  -0.105***
Non_ACS ACS Diff Non_ACS ACS Diff Non_ACS ACS Diff Non_ACS ACS Diff
NON-STATE Low  2.796  1.754  -1.042***  2.266  1.816  -0.449***  2.449  1.726  -0.723***  2.256  1.304  -0.953***
STATE High  2.022  1.567  -0.456***  1.837  1.661  -0.176**  1.950  1.535  -0.415***  1.806  1.565  -0.240**
CO Low  2.333  1.534  -0.799***  1.991  1.607  -0.384***  2.135  1.506  -0.629***  1.973  1.426  -0.547***
CO High  2.103  1.927  -0.176**  2.017  2.011   -0.006  2.153  1.881  -0.272**  2.152  1.627  -0.525***
IO Low  2.430  1.874  -0.556***  2.095  1.914  -0.181**  2.187  1.743  -0.444***  2.143  1.565  -0.578***
IO High  1.997  1.381  -0.616***  1.759  1.330  -0.429***  1.882  1.346  -0.536***  1.925  1.258   -0.667**
INDP Low  2.035  1.661  -0.374***  1.859  1.724  -0.135*  1.972  1.620  -0.352***  1.885  1.389  -0.496***
INDP High  2.639  1.671  -0.967***  2.210  1.778  -0.432***  2.389  1.657  -0.732***  2.155  1.427  -0.728***
    This table presents the mean difference of agency costs between accessible and non-accessible firms at different levels of governance structures. In Panel A, I calculate the
mean difference of EXPR  between accessible and non-accessible firms within the Low and High STATE  (CO , IO , INDP ) samples. In Panel B,  I calculate the mean difference
of agency costs measured by ORECA . All variables are defined in Table 1. The sample consists of 4247 firm-year observations covering the period of 2008-2010. Significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Panel A: EXPR  by Governance and Corporate Accessibility
IR_ACS CALL_ACS EMAIL_ACS FORUM_ACS
Panel B: ORECA  by Governance and Corporate Accessibility
IR_ACS CALL_ACS EMAIL_ACS FORUM_ACS
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Table 9
Examining The Signaling Effects On Firm Performance Using Portfolio Sort Analysis
Non_ACS ACS Diff Non_ACS ACS Diff Non_ACS ACS Diff Non_ACS ACS Diff
NON-STATE Low  7.161  5.109  -2.052***  5.972  5.229  -0.743***  6.330  5.069  -1.262***  5.814  4.971  -0.843***
STATE High  6.606  5.877  -0.729***  6.330  5.946  -0.383*  6.497  5.796  -0.702***  6.212  6.113     -0.099
CO Low  6.717  5.304  -1.413***  6.095  5.388  -0.706***  6.343  5.240  -1.103***  5.918  5.201  -0.717***
CO High  6.948  5.933  -1.015***  6.508  5.974  -0.534*  6.730  5.861  -0.870***  6.340  5.823  -0.517*
IO Low  6.395  5.460  -0.935***  5.936  5.540  -0.396**  6.151  5.416  -0.734***  5.875  5.329  -0.546***
IO High  7.324  5.478  -1.846***  6.620  5.549  -1.071***  6.861  5.385  -1.476***  6.338  5.478  -0.860***
INDP Low  6.822  5.488  -1.334***  6.191  5.621  -0.570***  6.531  5.374  -1.158***  6.066  5.447  -0.619***
INDP High  6.707  5.440  -1.267***  6.203  5.434  -0.769***  6.305  5.455  -0.849***  6.028  5.297  -0.731***
Non_ACS ACS Diff Non_ACS ACS Diff Non_ACS ACS Diff Non_ACS ACS Diff
NON-STATE Low  2.063  2.298  0.235***  2.124  2.351  0.227***  2.173  2.285  0.112***  2.192  2.388  0.196***
STATE High  1.801  1.855  0.053**  1.808  1.874  0.066**  1.813  1.853      0.040  1.826  1.861      0.036
CO Low  1.831  2.140  0.309***  1.917  2.190  0.273***  1.932  2.128  0.196***  1.982  2.245  0.263***
CO High  1.893  1.957  0.064*  1.955  2.071  0.116**  1.953  1.965   0.012  1.954  2.103   0.149**
IO Low  1.841  1.980  0.139***  1.863  2.025  0.162***  1.889  1.969  0.080***  1.906  2.045  0.139***
IO High  1.984  2.376  0.392***  2.091  2.420  0.330***  2.087  2.381  0.293***  2.164  2.496  0.332***
INDP Low  1.896  2.081  0.185***  1.940  2.115  0.175***  1.960  2.065  0.105***  1.969  2.221  0.251***
INDP High  1.861  2.096  0.235***  1.906  2.159  0.253***  1.926  2.097  0.171***  1.986  2.118  0.132***
    This table presents the mean difference of firm performance between accessible and non-accessible firms at different levels of governance structures. In Panel A, I calculate
the mean difference of COC  between accessible and non-accessible firms within the Low and High STATE  (CO , IO , INDP ) samples. In Panel B and Panel C,  I calculate the
mean difference of firm performance measured by TobinQ  and NOM , respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1. The sample consists of 4247 (3046 for COC )  firm-year
observations covering the period of 2008-2010. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Panel A: COC  by Governance and Corporate Accessibility
IR_ACS CALL_ACS EMAIL_ACS FORUM_ACS
Panel B: TobinQ  by Governance and Corporate Accessibility
IR_ACS CALL_ACS EMAIL_ACS FORUM_ACS
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Table 9 (Continued)
Non_ACS ACS Diff Non_ACS ACS Diff Non_ACS ACS Diff Non_ACS ACS Diff
NON-STATE Low  7.636  10.126  2.490***  8.614  10.298  1.684***  8.310  10.331  2.021***  8.310  12.108  3.798***
STATE High  5.724  7.824  2.100***  6.794  6.961      0.167  6.421  7.454  1.033***  6.453  9.606  3.153***
CO Low  6.172  9.653  3.481***  7.742  9.181  1.439***  7.211  9.563  2.352***  7.626  11.664  4.038***
CO High  6.732  8.284  1.552**  6.795  7.749  0.954**  6.940  7.441  0.501  6.789   9.341  2.552***
IO Low  5.085  7.758  2.673***  6.278  7.474  1.196***  6.649  8.421  1.772***  6.280  9.280  3.000***
IO High  9.307  12.334  3.027***  10.510  12.070  1.559***  10.612  12.676  2.063***  10.255  15.026  4.771***
INDP Low  6.457  9.318  2.861***  7.516  9.274  1.759***  7.428  9.106  1.678***  7.590  11.421  3.832***
INDP High  6.190  8.635  2.445***  7.468  8.072      0.604  6.727  8.780  2.053***  7.120  10.633  3.514***
Panel C: NOM  by Governance and Corporate Accessibility
IR_ACS CALL_ACS EMAIL_ACS FORUM_ACS
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Table 10
The Impact of Ownership and Governance Structures on The Signaling Effects (ORECA )
IR_ACS CALL_ACS EMAIL_ACS FORUM_ACS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ACS  -1.041***  -0.654***  -0.753***  -1.132***
( -4.80) ( -3.11) ( -3.66) ( -4.37)
ACS * STATE  0.611***  0.343**  0.370**  0.575***
( 3.83) ( 2.23) ( 2.43) ( 2.86)
ACS * CO  0.281***  0.338***  0.271***  0.102
( 2.75) ( 3.18) ( 2.68) ( 0.73)
ACS * IO  -0.309  -2.534**  -1.821* -1.143
( -0.23) ( -2.13) ( -1.76) ( -1.53)
ACS * INDP -0.122  -0.522**  -0.402 0.547
(-0.19) ( -1.97) ( -0.82) (0.89)
STATE  -0.778***  -0.513***  -0.541***  -0.531***
( -5.98) ( -4.84) ( -5.00) ( -6.06)
CO  -0.085  -0.040  -0.041  0.053
( -1.09) ( -0.64) ( -0.59) ( 0.96)
IO  -1.276  -0.337  -0.986  -2.020**
( -1.16) ( -0.36) ( -1.00) ( -2.54)
INDP  0.490  0.505*  0.569*  0.024
( 0.78) ( 1.79) ( 1.69) ( 0.09)
Controlling X Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj Rsq 12.05% 11.80% 11.78% 12.54%
STATE @20% (STATE =0)  -0.641***  -0.542**  -0.570***  -0.818***
( -3.04) ( -2.34) ( -2.76) ( -6.03)
STATE @80% (STATE =1)  -0.230*  -0.233*  -0.242**  -0.131
( -1.76) ( -1.92) ( -2.07) ( -1.57)
CO@20%  -0.426***  -0.478**  -0.314***  -0.483***
( -4.78) ( -2.25) ( -3.68) ( -4.23)
CO@80%  -0.249***  -0.259  -0.143*  -0.418***
( -3.04) ( -1.22) ( -1.82) ( -3.71)
IO@20%  -0.306***  -0.247  -0.335*  -0.258*
( -3.09) ( -1.13) ( -1.77) ( -1.86)
IO@80%  -0.345***  -0.447**  -0.399**  -0.506***
( -3.82) ( -2.08) ( -2.14) ( -2.96)
INDP @20%  -0.235***  -0.104  -0.145*  -0.471***
( -2.61) ( -1.17) ( -1.67) ( -3.91)
INDP @80%  -0.466***  -0.208**  -0.331***  -0.412***
( -5.09) ( -2.30) ( -3.77) ( -3.44)
     This table presents the regression results on the impact of ownership structures and governance structures on the
signaling effects of corporate accessibility on ORECA . The experimented accessibility variables (ACS ) are IR_ACS  in
(1) , CALL_ACS  in (2), EMAIL_ACS  in (3), and FORUM_ACS  in (4). All variables are defined in Table 1. The sample
consists of 4247 firm-year observations covering the period of 2008-2010. The t statistics are reported in parentheses.
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **,and ***, respectively.
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Table 11
The Impact of Ownership and Governance Structures on The Signaling Effects (EXPR )
IR_ACS CALL_ACS EMAIL_ACS FORUM_ACS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ACS  -0.112***  -0.137***  -0.059**  -0.108***
( -4.47) ( -5.61) ( -2.48) ( -3.61)
ACS * STATE  0.054***  0.037**  0.033*  -0.003
( 3.13) ( 2.19) ( 1.90) ( -0.14)
ACS * CO  0.064***  0.071***  0.042***  0.055***
( 5.41) ( 5.70) ( 3.56) ( 3.30)
ACS * IO  -0.251* -0.225  -0.449***  -0.283**
( -1.92) ( -1.48) ( -2.98) ( -2.09)
ACS * INDP  -0.083  -0.124* -0.031 -0.049
( -1.48) ( -1.91) (-0.37) (-0.54)
STATE  0.058***  0.074***  0.078***  0.086***
( 2.91) ( 4.14) ( 4.30) ( 4.54)
CO  -0.017  -0.005  0.001  0.011*
( -1.56) ( -0.65) ( 0.10) ( 1.80)
IO  -0.116  -0.160*  -0.046  -0.237**
( -0.89) ( -1.91) ( -0.40) ( -2.56)
INDP  0.122*  0.103  0.086  0.103
( 1.87) ( 1.19) ( 0.72) ( 1.10)
Controlling X Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj Rsq 13.21% 13.29% 12.86% 13.30%
STATE @20% (STATE =0)  -0.067***  -0.074***  -0.024*  -0.057***
( -2.77) ( -2.79) ( -1.75) ( -3.66)
STAT E@80% (STATE =1)  -0.030*  -0.035* -0.010  -0.058**
( -1.75) ( -1.82) (-0.92) ( -2.43)
CO@20%  -0.059***  -0.078***  -0.020**  -0.066***
( -2.76) ( -3.22) ( -2.00) ( -5.02)
CO@80%  -0.028*  -0.033** -0.006  -0.035***
( -1.83) ( -1.98) (-0.66) ( -2.69)
IO@20%  -0.025*  -0.045*  0.014  -0.037**
( -1.75) ( -1.83) ( 1.25) ( -2.41)
IO@80%  -0.045**  -0.063**  -0.021**  -0.059***
( -2.07) ( -2.51) ( -2.09) ( -4.13)
INDP @20%  -0.015*  0.003  -0.010  -0.037**
( -1.68) ( 0.25) ( -1.18) ( -2.10)
INDP @80%  -0.018*  -0.027**  -0.017*  -0.050***
( -1.87) ( -2.55) ( -1.76) ( -4.17)
     This table presents the regression results on the impact of ownership structures and governance structures on the
signaling effects of corporate accessibility on EXPR . The experimented accessibility variables (ACS ) are IR_ACS  in (1)
, CALL_ACS  in (2), EMAIL_ACS  in (3), and FORUM_ACS  in (4). All variables are defined in Table 1. The sample
consists of 4247 firm-year observations covering the period of 2008-2010. The t statistics are reported in parentheses.
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **,and ***, respectively.
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Table 12
The Impact of Ownership and Governance Structures on The Signaling Effects (COC )
IR_ACS CALL_ACS EMAIL_ACS FORUM_ACS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ACS  -1.159***  -0.623***  -0.724***  -1.147***
( -4.63) ( -2.60) ( -3.09) ( -4.01)
ACS * STATE  0.406**  0.132*  0.077  0.723***
( 2.22) ( 1.75) ( 0.45) ( 3.28)
ACS * CO  0.553***  0.345***  0.333***  0.406***
( 4.72) ( 2.85) ( 2.87) ( 2.58)
ACS * IO  -5.460***  -4.278***  -3.929***  -2.349
( -3.67) ( -2.93) ( -2.74) ( -1.17)
ACS * INDP  0.261  0.671  0.706  -0.360
( 0.47) ( 0.98) ( 1.28) ( -0.41)
STATE  -0.527**  -0.289  -0.282  -0.383***
( -2.48) ( -1.38) ( -1.27) ( -2.77)
CO  -0.325***  -0.121  -0.144  -0.074
( -2.62) ( -1.25) ( -1.32) ( -1.16)
IO  -0.561  -2.184  -1.898  -3.878***
( -0.45) ( -1.41) ( -1.32) ( -3.38)
INDP  0.408  0.448  0.242  0.620
( 0.76) ( 0.79) ( 0.37) ( 1.43)
Controlling X Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj Rsq 21.61% 21.31% 21.12% 21.52%
STATE @20% (STATE =0)  -0.707***  -0.363***  -0.464***  -0.841**
( -4.72) ( -2.69) ( -3.46) ( -2.45)
STATE @80% (STATE =1)  -0.279**  -0.211*  -0.392***  -0.118
( -2.55) ( -1.83) ( -3.59) ( -0.36)
CO@20%  -0.676***  -0.402***  -0.550***  -0.493***
( -6.56) ( -4.02) ( -5.64) ( -3.97)
CO@80%  -0.315***  -0.183*  -0.325***  -0.236*
( -3.31) ( -1.95) ( -3.58) ( -1.89)
IO@20%  -0.245**  -0.091  -0.251**  -0.261*
( -2.06) ( -0.78) ( -2.24) ( -1.75)
IO@80%  -0.664***  -0.436***  -0.566***  -0.424***
( -6.70) ( -4.56) ( -6.01) ( -3.27)
INDP @20%  -0.526***  -0.314***  -0.507***  -0.323**
( -5.04) ( -3.05) ( -5.06) ( -2.43)
INDP @80%  -0.401***  -0.232**  -0.303***  -0.392***
( -3.72) ( -2.19) ( -2.97) ( -3.00)
     This table presents the regression results on the impact of ownership structures and governance structures on the
signaling effects of corporate accessibility on COC . The experimented accessibility variables (ACS ) are IR_ACS  in (1) ,
CALL_ACS  in (2), EMAIL_ACS  in (3), and FORUM_ACS  in (4). All variables are defined in Table 1. The sample
consists of 4247 firm-year observations covering the period of 2008-2010. The t statistics are reported in parentheses.
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **,and ***, respectively.
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Table 13
The Impact of Ownership and Governance Structures on The Signaling Effects (TobinQ )
IR_ACS CALL_ACS EMAIL_ACS FORUM_ACS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ACS  0.460***  0.514***  0.173**  0.415***
( 5.49) ( 6.21) ( 2.13) ( 4.04)
ACS * STATE  -0.132**  -0.219***  -0.161*  -0.167**
( -2.14) ( -3.63) ( -1.92) ( -2.12)
ACS * CO  -0.273***  -0.199***  -0.157***  -0.233***
( -6.95) ( -4.76) ( -3.97) ( -4.21)
ACS * IO  2.752***  0.694  3.168***  3.017***
( 4.89) ( 1.26) ( 5.80) ( 3.87)
ACS * INDP  0.176 0.189  0.085  0.066
( 0.91) ( 1.32) ( 0.44) ( 0.23)
STATE  -0.189***  -0.177***  -0.268***  -0.243***
( -3.78) ( -4.33) ( -6.41) ( -7.15)
CO  0.029  -0.052**  -0.054**  -0.088***
( 0.99) ( -2.15) ( -2.05) ( -4.11)
IO  2.336***  3.850***  2.455***  3.745***
( 4.92) ( 9.82) ( 5.76) ( 11.10)
INDP  -0.277*  -0.055  -0.210  -0.147
( -1.86) ( -0.49) ( -1.57) ( -1.42)
Controlling X Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj Rsq 30.05% 29.40% 29.44% 29.30%
STATE @20% (STATE =0)  0.290***  0.174*  0.119**  0.277***
( 3.48) ( 1.94) ( 2.51) ( 5.03)
STATE @80% (STATE =1)  0.157**  0.050  0.091**  0.100*
( 2.12) ( 1.29) ( 2.43) ( 1.68)
CO@20%  0.316***  0.220***  0.157***  0.267***
( 4.29) ( 6.44) ( 4.65) ( 5.85)
CO@80%  0.139*  0.099***  0.061*  0.112**
( 1.91) ( 3.09) ( 1.95) ( 2.51)
IO@20%  0.100**  0.118***  0.055  0.084*
( 2.03) ( 3.06) ( 1.06) ( 1.79)
IO@80%  0.314***  0.181***  0.242***  0.288***
( 4.16) ( 5.08) ( 3.26) ( 2.63)
INDP @20%  0.154***  0.142***  0.103***  0.132***
( 4.33) ( 4.08) ( 2.98) ( 4.41)
INDP @80%  0.172***  0.169***  0.105***  0.165***
( 4.72) ( 4.75) ( 3.02) ( 2.85)
     This table presents the regression results on the impact of ownership structures and governance structures on the
signaling effects of corporate accessibility on TobinQ . The experimented accessibility variables (ACS ) are IR_ACS  in
(1) , CALL_ACS  in (2), EMAIL_ACS  in (3), and FORUM_ACS  in (4). All variables are defined in Table 1. The sample
consists of 4247 firm-year observations covering the period of 2008-2010. The t statistics are reported in parentheses.
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **,and ***, respectively.
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Table 14
The Impact of Ownership and Governance Structures on The Signaling Effects (NOM )
IR_ACS CALL_ACS EMAIL_ACS FORUM_ACS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ACS  1.891***  1.489**  2.021***  1.518**
( 3.03) ( 2.42) ( 3.39) ( 2.04)
ACS * STATE  -0.851*  -1.007**  -1.407***  -0.796*
( -1.95) ( -2.26) ( -3.22) ( -1.93)
ACS * CO  -1.028***  -0.658**  -0.932***  -1.111***
( -3.53) ( -2.11) ( -3.20) ( -2.79)
ACS * IO  13.779***  8.080**  15.450***  29.711***
( 3.36) ( 2.00) ( 3.88) ( 5.35)
ACS * INDP  0.485  1.810 0.503  0.643
( 0.35) ( 1.11) ( 0.36) (0.42)
STATE  -0.200  -0.071  0.168  -0.274
( -0.53) ( -0.23) ( 0.54) ( -1.09)
CO  0.681***  0.344*  0.526***  0.296*
( 3.16) ( 1.94) ( 2.72) ( 1.88)
IO  -16.278***  -10.924***  -15.471***  -11.970***
( -4.73) ( -3.80) ( -5.01) ( -4.87)
INDP  -1.717*  -1.247  -1.204  -1.312
( -1.68) ( -1.54) ( -1.53) ( -1.59)
Controlling X Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj Rsq 30.08% 29.79% 29.96% 39.88%
STATE @20% (STATE =0)  1.275***  1.650**  1.580***  1.599***
( 3.41) ( 2.48) ( 4.63) ( 4.09)
STATE @80% (STATE =1)  0.888***  0.643*  0.169  0.937**
( 3.28) ( 1.74) ( 0.62) ( 2.17)
CO@20%  1.420***  1.343**  1.137***  1.620***
( 5.53) ( 2.21) ( 4.63) ( 4.92)
CO@80%  0.781***  0.916  0.562**  0.937***
( 3.30) ( 1.50) ( 2.47) ( 2.90)
IO@20%  0.527**  0.759*  0.193  0.109
( 2.13) ( 191) ( 1.57) ( 1.02)
IO@80%  1.502***  1.387**  1.323***  2.237***
( 5.59) ( 2.25) ( 5.16) ( 6.29)
INDP @20%  0.873***  0.413**  -0.145*  -0.471***
( 3.27) ( 1.98) ( -1.67) ( -3.91)
INDP @80%  1.195***  0.590**  -0.331***  -0.412***
( 4.60) ( 2.31) ( -3.77) ( -3.44)
     This table presents the regression results on the impact of ownership structures and governance structures on the
signaling effects of corporate accessibility on NOM . The experimented accessibility variables (ACS ) are IR_ACS  in (1) ,
CALL_ACS  in (2), EMAIL_ACS  in (3), and FORUM_ACS  in (4). All variables are defined in Table 1. The sample
consists of 4247 firm-year observations covering the period of 2008-2010. The t statistics are reported in parentheses.
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **,and ***, respectively.
64 
 
Table 15
The Signaling Effects of Intrumented Corporate Accessibility
Panel A: Ivs validty and strength tests
IR_ACS CALL_ACS EMAIL_ACS FORUM_ACS
nR2       0.29       0.00       0.29       0.00
Hausman Prob  0.0788*  0.0680*  0.0737*  0.0110**
Panel B: Instrumented corporate accessibility and corporate performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ORECA EXPR COC TobinQ NOM
IR_ACS  -0.472***  -0.018*  -0.139*  0.187***  1.508***
( -5.52) ( -1.80) ( -1.71) ( 4.63) ( 4.14)
CALL_ACS  -0.739***  -0.028*  -0.206**  0.290***  2.381***
( -5.50) ( -1.76) ( -2.33) ( 4.56) ( 4.15)
EMAIL_ACS  -0.872***  -0.030**  -0.175*  0.326***  2.918***
( -5.36) ( -2.05) ( -1.93) ( 4.22) ( 4.20)
FORUM_ACS  -0.510***  -0.024**  -0.246**  0.227***  1.470***
( -5.61) ( -2.27) ( -2.38) ( 5.29) ( 3.80)
   The table presents the results on the analysis of the signaling effects of instrumented corporate accessibility.
Panel A reports test results on the validty of IVs. Panel B reports the regression results in the second stage, the
dependent variables are  ORECA  in (1), EXPR  in (2), COC  in (3), TobinQ in (4), and NOM  in (5).  Only coefficients
of experimented variables (accessibility variables) are reported. The sample consists of 4297  (3046) firm-year
observations covering the period of 2008-2010. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-stat is reported on the
left in paraentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **,and ***, respectively.
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Table 16
The Signaling Effects Controlling for More Governance Variables and Regional Dummies 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IR_ACS  -0.275*** -0.024**  -0.541***  0.137***  0.869***
( -3.38) (- 2.01) ( -5.84) ( 4.19) ( 3.44)
STATE  -0.393***  0.087***  -0.389***  -0.261***  -0.315
( -4.28) ( 7.89) ( -3.71) ( -7.06) ( -1.10)
CO  0.023  0.018***  -0.035  -0.122***  0.183
( 0.42) ( 2.79) ( -0.57) ( -5.66) ( 1.10)
IO  0.476  -0.276***  -7.060***  5.141***  -5.590**
( 0.59) ( -2.80) ( -7.79) ( 14.61) ( -2.09)
INDP  0.348  0.049  0.472  -0.128  -0.931
( 1.35) ( 1.57) ( 1.60) ( -1.22) ( -1.18)
SIZE  -0.042  -0.024***  0.144**  0.026  1.254***
( -0.72) ( -3.39) ( 2.20) ( 0.71) ( 4.51)
LEV  -1.686***  0.020  3.761***  -1.590***  3.639***
( -4.47) ( 0.44) ( 8.61) ( -10.76) ( 3.15)
VOL  -0.172  0.017  1.541***  -0.080  -0.596
( -1.26) ( 0.77) ( 7.48) ( -1.48) ( -1.39)
ILLIQ  -5.028  -1.280**  -28.930***  5.265***  -1.177
( -1.51) ( -2.06) ( -4.82) ( 7.26) ( -0.21)
ROA  -0.003  -0.010***  -0.006  0.065**  -0.059
( -0.34) ( -9.90) ( -0.65) ( 2.39) ( -0.23)
lambda  -0.039  0.017  0.387**  0.025  0.660
( -0.24) ( 0.90) ( 2.10) ( 0.39) ( 1.34)
Mgt_Hld  -0.537  -0.165***  -1.006**  0.535***  2.581**
( -1.51) ( -3.93) ( -2.57) ( 3.44) ( 2.19)
BOARD  -0.513**  0.078***  0.180  -0.281***  0.990
( -2.50) ( 3.14) ( 0.77) ( -3.45) ( 1.57)
MEETING  0.710***  0.007  -0.216*  -0.089**  0.674**
( 7.01) ( 0.58) ( -1.90) ( -2.11) ( 2.08)
BIG4  0.037  0.238***  0.353*  -0.250***  -0.245
( 0.19) ( 9.91) ( 1.65) ( -3.32) ( -0.42)
COVERAGE  -0.258***  0.032***  0.724***  -0.164***  -0.167
( -5.10) ( 5.22) ( 11.79) ( -8.14) ( -1.07)
RegEst  -0.272**  0.005  0.334***  -0.150***  -1.156***
( -2.52) ( 0.42) ( 2.67) ( -3.50) ( -3.49)
RegMid  -0.096  -0.003  0.213  -0.041  -1.761***
( -0.76) ( -0.19) ( 1.46) ( -0.82) ( -4.50)
RegNE  0.154  0.028  0.333  -0.029  -0.593
( 0.85) ( 1.26) ( 1.60) ( -0.41) ( -1.06)
Intercept  4.706***  0.558***  0.571  2.392***  -25.907***
( 3.52) ( 3.45) ( 0.38) ( 3.00) ( -4.19)
Induestry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj Rsq 14.38% 18.31% 25.00% 30.55% 31.66%
    This table presents the regression results on the robustness of the signaling effects of corporate accessibility
(measured by IR_ACS ) after controlling for other governance variables and regional dummies . The dependent
variables are ORECA  in (1), EXPR  in (2),  COC  in (3), TobinQ  in (4), and NOM  in (5). All variables are defined in Table
1. The sample consists of 4247 (3046 for COC ) firm-year observations covering the period of 2008-2010. t statistics are
reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **,and ***, respectively.
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APPENDIX A 
 
My data collection involves two major processes. First, I manually collected data 
from company websites. Second, I directly contacted the listed companies by using 
telephone and email. As the data-collection work was very time-consuming, I worked 
with three research assistants (RAs) to collect the data. The whole data collection 
process lasted from July 1 to September 30 in 2010.  
 
1. Data collection from IR section 
I first obtained company website addresses of all firms listed on China’s two stock 
exchange firms. I and the RAs then started with a survey of the information provided via 
the IR section on a firm’s website. The survey involves collecting data in three parts, 
namely, telephone and email contact information, online forum, and other characteristics 
of the IR section and the website. The data collection form is provided in Appendix B.  
The procedures to collect data from the IR section are specified as follows: First, I 
and the RAs went to the main page of the listed companies by using the website address 
provided by the CSMAR database and checked whether there was an IR section within 
the website. If yes, we went to the IR section and collected the telephone and email 
contact information (if any). We then checked whether there was an online discussion 
forum. If yes, we examined whether there were postings by visitors and corresponding 
replies by the company. We also counted and recorded the number of postings by visitors 
and replies by the company. I treat the online forum as accessible if both “Posting by 
visitors exists?” and “Responses by the company exist?” were answered as yes or 
indicated by 1, and count it as non-accessible otherwise13. 
                                                
13 The terms in this sentence with double quotation marks come from the IR section survey form, see 
Appendix B. 
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In addition, I also collected information in the IR section or on other pages that 
might be relevant for my research, such as fax contact information, financial 
announcements, and other news announcements, etc. This data collection from 
companies’ website took us one month from July 1 to July 31 in 2010.  
 
2. Contacting listed firms 
After I completed the data collection from companies’ websites, I and the RAs 
directly contacted the companies via telephone and email in the capacity of minority 
shareholders. In order to ensure the reliability of the collected data, I developed a set of 
clear protocols to govern the whole data collection process. 
 
2.1. Contacting by telephone call 
I and the RAs made telephone calls to each listed company by enquiring whether a 
company can arrange a company visit. Appendix C shows the telephone survey form 
that I prepared for us to make the calls to the listed companies. The instrument that we 
used to make the calls was Skype. All conversations were made in Chinese Putonghua 
and recorded using the Goldwave software. All calls were made during general office 
hours (8:00am—12:00am & 2:00pm—6:00pm) and the process lasted from August 1 
2010 to September 30 in 2010 except on holidays. Diagram 1 illustrates the call process. 
I scheduled two rounds in making the call (the gap between the two rounds was 
generally one week). In each round, I scheduled two times to make the calls—one in the 
morning, the other one in the afternoon. For example, in one morning, we made the first 
call to a company, but with no answer. We then made the second call in the afternoon, 
with no answer again. We then tried a second round one week later and made the third 
and the fourth trials in the morning and the afternoon, respectively. No more calls would 
be made and the company was recorded as non-accessible if we were not able to contact 
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the company after four trials. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 1 
Make the call 
Contact successfully? 
Special arrangement? 
Yes 
Accessible Non-accessible 
Yes, without 
appointment 
Yes, with 
appointment 
No 
Special treatment list: 
Call the company on 
(at) the date (time) 
appointed 
Exceed 4 Calls? 
No 
No 
Yes 
Effective talk? 
Yes 
No 
Telephone numbers collected in the IR Section 
General Schedule: 8am-12am & 2pm-6pm, Aug 1-Sep 30 2010 
 
1st round                     2nd round 
 
Call 1: Morning                Call 3: Morning 
 
Call 2: Afternoon               Call 4: Afternoon 
 
 No more calls will be made after four trials 
(1 week later) 
 
 Once we contacted the company successfully, we tried to find the person in charge 
of the company (e.g, the person in charge of the investor relations department). However, 
sometimes we might not find a responsible person at that moment. In some cases, the 
person had to seek advice from his boss or colleagues (but they were absent). In this case, 
we needed to find another time and call back the company (a special arrangement was 
needed). We would try to make a next-call appointment with the company. If such an 
appointment was made, we would put the company in the special treatment list, and call 
it back on (at) the date (time) appointed. If in the case we needed a special arrangement 
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but the company was unwilling to accommodate us, we were unable to go to the next 
step and would record the company as non-accessible.  
My aim is not to actually visit the firm but to ascertain how the company 
effectively responds to us. I consider the communication channel in terms of telephone 
call as accessible if we were able to effectively discuss with the company about the issue 
of the company visit. An effective discussion can be either the case that the company 
affirmatively accepted our request or the case that it rejected our request for some 
acceptable reasons. One instance in the case of “rejected our request for some acceptable 
reasons” was that some companies replied “we do not accept visitors these days as the 
company is under financial auditing in preparation for the issue of the annual report. 
However, we will consider your request after this period”. In some other cases where it 
was difficult to judge whether the respondents “rejected our request for some acceptable 
reason”, I followed a conservative strategy and treated it as non-accessible (if it’s 
difficult to judge, the effectiveness of the talk can be a problem).  
Overall, the telephone channel is accessible if the answer to the “Allow a company 
visit?” is yes, or the answer is no but an acceptable reason can be found in the “If no, 
reasons”. It’s non-accessible if 4 call trials are made but the “Who answers the phone?” 
is empty, or the “Is a special arrangements needed” is yes but the “Appointed date or 
time” is empty, or the “Allow a company visit?” is no and acceptable reasons can’t be 
justified in “If no, reasons”. Otherwise, the variable measuring the telephone 
accessibility will be a missing observation14. 
 
2.2.  Contacting by email 
With the email address collected from the IR section on firms’ website, I sent 
                                                
14 The terms in this paragraph with double quotation marks come from the telephone survey form, see 
Appendix C. 
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emails to the listed companies by asking a general question—the major locations where 
the firms have their business operations. Diagram 2 illustrates the email sending process.
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
Diagram 2 
Send the email 
Accessible Non-accessible 
No, with two 
emails sent 
Yes 
Email address collected in the IR Section 
The first sending: 8:30am, Aug 30 2010 (Monday) 
 
 Email service provider: Google Gmail 
 Sent to all listed firms at one time with “undisclosed 
recipients” 
 The email was written in Chinese 
 
Reply? 
No, with one 
email sent 
The second sending: (2
weeks later) 
Re-send the email to firms 
that didn’t reply to the first 
sending 
 
The email service provider I chose was Google Gmail because it’s widely 
recognized and generally would not been dumped in the spam email category. The email 
was written in Chinese and sent during general office hours (specifically, it was 8:30pm, 
Aug 30 2010 (Monday)). It was sent to all listed companies at one time with 
“undisclosed recipients” to minimize the risk of introducing new factors that will affect 
companies’ responsiveness. The companies might fail to receive our email due to some 
technical problems or wrongly delete the email received. To minimize this risk, I re-sent 
the email to the companies that didn’t reply to me in the first sending two weeks later. 
The email translated in English can be seen as below:  
“Dear Sir or Madam 
I am a minority shareholder of this company. I am concerned about the 
operating conditions of the company. I would like to know the major locations 
where the company has its business operations, such as the city or province. I didn’t 
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find consistent answers based on my own searches. To get first-hand information, I 
am therefore contacting the company directly. I am looking forward to hearing your 
reply soon. Many thanks. 
Yours sincerely 
Mr. Zhao” 
In all reply cases, my questions were answered directly and the reply appeared to 
cluster at 3-4 days after the email was sent with very few responses after 10 days. I 
record the communications in terms of email as accessible if I did receive a reply from 
the company in either of the two email sendings, and count it as non-accessible 
otherwise.  
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APPENDIX B
Website Company Web available?
IR section
exists?
IR phone exists? IR phone IR email exists? IR email
IR hot-line
exists?
IR hot-line IR fax exists? IR fax
Financial
announcements
exist?
Other
announcements
exist?
General phone
exists?
General phone
Financial
announcements exist?
Other announcements
exist?
Instructions to RAs checking the IR section
1. Use Internet Explorer to open the company website. The website might not be opened due to some technical problems (e.g, the website is busy or out of service at the
moment). In this case, mark the company in a different color and make more trials later on. Treat it as a failure after enough trials have been made (at least three times on three
different days).
2. Generally, an item named in "Investor Relations" can be found on the main menu of the website. Click it and go into the IR section where you can see various IR items. In
case you can't find the IR section at the first glance, be careful to search around by jumping back and forth inside the page.
3. In the IR section, check whether it provides telephone and email contact information. If yes, input 1 in the cell of "IR phone exists?" and "IR email exists?", respectively, and
input 0 otherwise. Also copy the contact information into the cells provided.  Then check whether there is an online discussion forum. If yes, see whether there are postings by
visitors and corresponding replies by the company. Input 1 if yes and input 0 if no. Also count the number of postings by visitors and responses by the company and input
them in the cells.
4. Similary, collect other information in the IR section and on pages. Input 1 in the cell when the corresponding item on the website exists, and 0 when it does not exist. Specific
information on the item, if any, is recorded in the next cell.
Other information in the IR in section (yes:1, no:0) Information on general web pages (not in the IR section) (yes:1, no:0)
IR Section Survey Form
Basic information (given) Telephone and Email information in the IR section (yes:1, no:0)
On-line forum information in the IR section (yes:1, no:0)
IR discussion forum
exists?
Posting by visitors exists? Responses by the company exist? Number of postings by visitors Number of responses by the company
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APPENDIX C
Company Industry
Telephone
number
1st call 2nd call 3rd call 4th call
Who answers the
phone?
Is a special arrangement
needed? (yes:1, no:0)
Appointed date or
time
Minutes
Who
answers the
phone?
Is a special
arrangement needed?
(yes:1, no:0)
Appointed
date or time
If yes, any
arrangements
If no, reasons Attitude Overall satisfaction
Telephone Survey Form
Basic information (given) Step 1: Contact the company (mark with the date) Step 2: Confirm with the company
1st Round 2nd Round Special arrangement 1st chance
Step 2: Confirm with the company (backup) Step 3: Question and talk Step 4: Evaluation
Special arrangement 2nd chance 1 to 5: 1 is the best, 5 is the worest
4. In step 2, introduce yourself (You were a minority shareholder of the company. You and 4 other minority shareholders would like to have a company visit to the listed
company). Before the request, try to find the person in charge of the company (e.g., person in charge of the investor relations department). Input yes in the cell of " Is special
arrangement needed" in the case where the responsible person can't be found at that moment. Try to make a next-call appointment with the company. If such an appointment
was made, put it in the special treatment list and mark down the date or time, and call back the company on (at) the date (time) appointed.
5. If reaching the person in charge of the company, begin the talk by asking whether it's possible to have a visit to the facilities of the company, e.g. factory. If yes, mark down
any arrangements. If no, mark down any reasons. No more calls will be made to this company.
6. As the call finishes, evaluate the talk by giving a rating on the attitude of the person answering the call and on your overall satisfaction. 1: excellent; 2: good; 3: general; 4:
bad; 5: very bad.
7. Minutes should be taken as precisely as possible.
Allow a company visit?
(yes:1, no:0)
Instructions to RAs making calls to the listed companies
1. Install Skype, log in with the account provided. Install Goldwave and make voice recordings in making the calls. The softwares together with a guideline (in Chinese) can be
2. Calls should be made during general office hours (8:00am—12:00am & 2:00pm—6:00pm) on weekdays. 
3. Make the 1st call in the morning (first round). If unsuccessful, make the 2nd one in the afternoon; If unsuccessful again, mark down the date and try the second round one
week later. The process in the second round is the same as in the first round. Whenever successfully connected, go to the next step.
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